No. 2
JANUARY 1988

NEW TIMES

A SOVIET WEEKLY
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

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

BYWAYS OF DRUG-TRAFFICKING

NIKOLAI RYZHKOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S.S.R. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, INTERVIEWED



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NEW TIMES

No. 2, January 1988
Founded 1943

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MAIN THEME



The sixth regular withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteers from Kampuchea took place at the end of last year after helping the nation defend its homeland.
Kampuchea is now celebrating its ninth anniversary of liberation from the Pol Pot regime and the creation of a people's republic. For a full report, turn to page 17.

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

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Our address: Pushkin Square, Moscow, GSP, 103782, U.S.S.R. Telephones: 229-88-72, 209-07-67

Publisher: Trud, Moscow ● Published in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Polish and Czech ● Telex: 411164a NEWT SU, 411164b NEWT SU, 411164c NEWT SU ● Cables: New Times Pushkin Square Moscow ● Printed by the Moskovskaya Pravda press in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

THE HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK

How to learn living in peace?

"Better a bad peace than a good quarrel," a Russian saying goes. I subscribe to it. I'd rather get along with the Americans somehow than fight them. After all, there were times when we worked hand in glove. I recall not only the Great Patriotic War but also détente, which many people in our two countries still have the memories of.

ANDREI CHERNIKOV,
Krasnodar Territory

Unfortunately, I can't say I am all that happy about the INF Treaty the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. have signed at last. Why? I am sure that the Americans will go on working on their SDI programme in spite of it. Chances are that this idea, no matter how fantastic and absurd it might seem, will be made a reality in the long run: the Americans are a stubborn lot. I hope against hope that the U.S.S.R. will succeed in talking the U.S. out of SDI sooner or later. It is only then that we will be able to heave a sigh of relief.

IVAR KRISTIANSEN
Oslo, Norway

I think we must broaden our contacts with the Americans in every way. We've got to sign not only disarmament treaties, but agreements on cooperation in the most varied spheres: science, ecology, culture, trade. We must learn to live in peace and build up the potential of understanding and cooperation. Then the day may come when we sign a treaty on good-neighbourliness, at least, if not on friendship. This is a cherished dream of mine.

VLADIMIR SHEVCHENKO,
Moscow

I am a civil engineer, which is the most peaceful profession on earth. I work at the house-building factory in Ulan Bator. The signing of the Soviet-American Treaty, a historic act of humanism, came as welcome news to me. From the bottom of my heart I wish the Soviet people further successes in promoting the cause of peace. May the progress made in Soviet-American relations go on. It detracts from the danger that hangs over mankind.

Zh. TSERENBALZHIR,
Ulan Bator, Mongolia

OPINIONS

About criticism...

I have had the privilege of living in the Soviet Union for a while, and I am one of those who entertain feelings of profound affection toward the Soviet people and welcome the events now in progress in your country.

As I read the papers, however, I notice that the Soviet press practically lends no criticisms towards the policy of those bourgeois countries with which the Soviet Union is friendly. Take my country, India, for instance. The Indian papers feel free to criticize the U.S.S.R. and so, it seems to me the Soviet press should also give an objective analysis of the situation in India. This would be only fair and useful, and would not at all cast a shadow on our relationship.

Dr J.A. NAIK,
Kolhapur, India

Scrap the devilish weapons

Even the few survivors of a nuclear war will feel its horrible effects which will cause them suffering beyond any human endurance. I think mankind has no option except to prevent nuclear war at any cost. After all, every one of us earthlings wants peace and security for the survival of mankind, irrespective of which road this or that state has taken and what kind of future it is working for. I am calling upon all to pool their efforts and to scrap these devilish weapons before they reduce us to ashes. The U.S.S.R. offers a programme aimed at achieving just that, and I am adding my voice to the Soviet appeal which goes: "Mankind must enter the next millenium without nuclear arms!"

ALEXIS RANDRIANASOLO,
Antananarivo, Madagascar

GLASNOST
From our mailbag

READERS ASK...

...about our history

I would like to raise the question of our red pantheon at the Kremlin Wall. I have read a lot about the remarkable people whose remains lie buried at the walls of the ancient Kremlin. I still can't figure out, though, why Nikita Khrushchev's grave isn't there. He headed our Party for over a decade and did a great deal for our nation. I am sure Khrushchev has gone down in history along with the 20th CPSU Congress which exposed the Stalin personality cult. He made a courageous effort for democracy in our society and pioneered the development of new lands. Besides, he made an appreciable contribution to the struggle for peace... Let's face it, the phenomenon now referred to as "voluntarism" did exist. Nevertheless, I suggest that we weigh all the pros and cons of the question of transferring Khrushchev's ashes to the Kremlin wall.

History must be treated with respect and taken for what it really was. Khrushchev must be given his due place on its pages, for the sake of fairness.

VITALY VOROBYOV,
Djezkazgan Region

...about alarming symptoms

I have learned recently that there are unemployed in Yugoslavia and that many of them seek jobs in other countries... In Montenegro, for instance, four factories have gone bankrupt and closed down. The "second reform" now under way will cost many more people their jobs as other unprofitable enterprises are put out of business. I haven't been in Hungary for long, but watching the developments in socialist countries I am coming to think that all of them are bound to have problems akin to those of Yugoslavia. Symptoms are already showing up in other countries. It has turned out that socialist countries are not insured against the social ills that are widespread in the capitalist ones: unemployment, backwardness of certain regions, foreign debt...

WALTER de VITA,
Szolnok, Hungary

Ostrichism.

Drawing by Igor Smirnov

MORE DEMOCRACY!

The economy is the best judge

I've been put out a bit by the returns of public opinion polls to believe that up to 50 per cent of the working people think their participation in production management is unnecessary and makes no sense. During the discussion of the Bill on State Enterprise it was suggested that the work collective council should be headed by the plant director himself. Then the idea assumed the form of a "strong recommendation from top."

The senselessness of this approach is obvious: the management cannot possibly be its own judge. Neither can the director. He is supposed to be an executive authority, and the council - a legislative body. Any merger of these two functions is impossible, for in this case either the director, or the council will assume a subordinate position.

The Bill provided for electing the work collective managers by a show of hands or by secret ballot. Actually, this practice is degenerating into a form of appointing the managers, camouflaged as elections. Elections by a show of hands are common in the absence of democracy. A director walks up to the platform and says: "I suggest you vote for Comrade So- and-So-. Any other suggestions?" There are none, as a rule: it's one thing to raise one's hand and be done with it, but voting by secret ballot is something else again. First of all, it takes longer (you've got to get the ballots ready and to elect a counting committee); and second, we have resigned ourselves to the fact that nothing depends on us anyway.

What's more, few will venture to propose a different candidature in front of the director, the shop superintendent and representatives of the local party committee seated in the presidium.

The trouble with us is that we have no "reserve" managers to choose from. Previously, there was no such problem: the factory director was simply appointed to the post. Today this will no longer do.

Another trouble is that we have never taught anyone to manage. A manager worth his salt is supposed to be a trained expert well versed in political economy, marketing and advertizing.

Let the economy itself determine whether a man is fit for this job. If profits start falling, and discipline loosening, this is a sure sign that a wrong man has been elected. Now, if a manager is good, why replace him?

It is my profound conviction that real self-support is impossible without self-management, i.e., without the workers being interested in performing well.

Professor EVGENY TORKANOVSKY,
D.Sc. (Econ.),
Moscow

"For personal consumption only..."

The way I see it, relatives living in different countries communicate either by visiting one another, or by mail. Forget the visits: you can only go once a year when you're on holiday, and, besides, travelling costs money. So the contacts must, by necessity, be confined to exchanging letters and parcels, for the most part.

To begin with, an ordinary letter (postage: 50 kopecks) takes about a month to cover the distance between the U.S.S.R. and, say, the U.S.A. Small parcels take even longer than that - from two to four months. A customs note enclosed in each parcel is certainly worth quoting. "The contents of this parcel," it says, "are intended for the addressee's personal consumption only and not subject to selling." Does that mean that if a shirt you've received doesn't fit, you've got to throw it away?

The "ordinary mortals" have no way of knowing the articles and provisions of the customs tariffs, but I've heard from the grapevine that the customs duties levied on certain items have grown tens and even hundreds of times over the past few years. More specific information is available only to the authorized few. I say, why not draw up a list of these items and display them prominently in international post offices? The most important thing for us is to learn about the customs duties and how high they are. Recently, my U.S. relatives sent me a scarf worth 10 dollars. The duty levied on it was 34 rubles. I can add to this that receiving a summer shirt by post costs 12 rubles; a pair of rubber shoes, 24 rubles; and a pair of jeans, 100 rubles. If a parcel contains an extra item, the extortion doubles automatically.

I consider it downright discrimination which is in no way conducive to maintaining contacts between relatives.

A. YURKEVICH,
Kalush,
Ivano-Frankovsk Region

GLASNOST

From our mailbag

THE CODE OF PEACE

Two years ago, when the disarmament talks became increasingly entangled in the nuclear maze and the arms race seemed to get out of control, the Soviet Union proposed a programme to rid the world of nuclear weapons by the end of the century.

Is a nuclear-free world possible? At the beginning of last year our magazine addressed this question to prominent political and public leaders in various countries. Many of them, especially politicians, took a pessimistic view. A nuclear-free world seemed to them an attractive utopia invented by the representatives of peace movements. A huge amount of weapons had been accumulated. Mistrust was deeply rooted, and reliance on military strength as the chief guarantor of national security was unshakable.

Nevertheless, the very logic of the nuclear age suggested a way out: to bring thinking into accordance with the technological development level of civilization, to put an end to stereotype approaches, and to overcome the fear of over-conceding to a partner. Moscow made a choice.

What has the world witnessed during the 730 days since January 15, 1986?

In Reykjavik, the Soviet and American leaders demonstrated for the first time that a new way of thinking could become a real policy. At the Stockholm and Geneva talks about various aspects of disarmament, the parties reached an agreement on confidence-building and security measures in Europe. They made headway toward drafting a convention on the global prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. At the U.N. General Assembly sessions more and more delegates have come out in favour of the Soviet proposal for establishing a comprehensive system of international security in military, political, economic and humanitarian fields.

At the Moscow forum "For a nuclear-free world, for the survival of mankind" people with the opposite views openly discussed the future of mankind. And finally, at the Washington summit, this new way of thinking has become a practical policy: a Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles has been concluded. The two parties declared that they would try to draft an agreement for a 50 per cent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons at the Moscow summit in late spring or early summer of 1988.

But, on the whole, the world situation remains disquieting. Local wars, economic troubles, hunger, diseases. We have noticed more often that the consequences of these evils affect the whole of our community. These evils can be overcome only by joint efforts, through mutual assistance.

For this reason January 15, 1986, was not merely a call to cut the nuclear Gordian knot, to establish a programme for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons at the same time calling for the non-militarization of outer space. It was not merely a call to destroy chemical weapons and reduce conventional arms. It is a proposal to live according to new, universal laws, when armaments will, in principle, cease to guarantee security, as the security of one state will become part of security for all. Mankind has yet to work out such a code of peace. But January 15, 1986, will remain a landmark in history.

NEWS NT

Humanitarian cooperation and human rights is the main subject of an interview granted New Times by deputy foreign minister of the U.S.S.R. Anatoly Adamishin, who discusses permission to leave the Soviet Union, the Soviet-American talks on humanitarian issues, and measures to strengthen the social and legal protection of Soviet people. The interview will appear in the next issue.

Also in the next issue you can read an article by doctor of chemistry Sergei Kara-Murza, vice-director of the Institute of the History of Natural Science and Technology, who discusses the financing of research and argues with those who propose to save money at its expense.

* * *

Last year the magazine received 2,417 letters from foreign readers and 2,136 from Soviets. They shared their views with us, expressed their opinions of articles published in New Times, and suggested new subjects and headings. As a result the headings Glasnost and Profiles have appeared in our pages. We sincerely thank our readers for their letters.

* * *

The editors of New Times recently played host to Lothar Heideman, chief editor of the newspaper Horizon (German Democratic Republic), who became acquainted with the work of our editorial office. In addition to Moscow the guest visited Leningrad and Novgorod.

* * *

In the new year the readers of our magazine will be able to read reports from its correspondents in Algeria, the German Democratic Republic, Zambia, India, Italy, Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, West Germany, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Japan. A new correspondent, Nikita Zholkver, recently took up duties in Bonn.

Sergei Svirin has begun his term as New Times correspondent in Bucharest while Pavel Negoitsa in Rome, and Rudolf Boretsky in Warsaw, have begun contributing to the magazine as non-staff correspondents.

Nikolai Ryzhkov:

Our revolutionary time

Question: In Sweden we have been following very closely the reform process in the U.S.S.R., which is generally referred to as "perestroika." Could you first make a general analysis of this "perestroika" and its causes and aims?

Answer: Perestroika is the process of revolutionary renewal of society and profound change in all spheres of life - political, economic, social and cultural. Formulated by the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 27th Party Congress, the concept of perestroika stems from the deep-going processes and real problems in Soviet society, and there is valid reason for its development.

Our goal is to quicken the pace of our progress, bring about a substantial improvement in people's well-being, steer socialist society to a drastically new level, and reveal the humanist nature of our system more fully. As the January 1987 Plenum noted, the policy of perestroika is a follow-up to the great accomplishments started by the Leninist party in October 1917. And it is not merely a continuation, but also a development and reinforcement of the main ideas of the revolution.

There are many reasons why perestroika has become indispensable. These include an economic slowdown, stagnation in many spheres, and mistakes and oversights by the country's leadership. As we say, there exists a mechanism that brakes our social and economic advancement.

One may ask: how has all this become possible? We have, naturally, been seeking an answer to this question ourselves by making an in-depth analysis of our past and our present. And it has become clear that the letup is rooted in the faulty functioning of socialist democracy and in the outdated, cumbersome economic mechanism that makes it impossible to harmonize the personal interests of working people with the interests of society as a whole.

Our socialist society has vast economic, political, cultural and moral potential. But we have been using them most inefficiently, and often wastefully. What are we going to do in the next few years to rectify the situation?

The period of ascertaining the causes of our problems is now over. We have worked out a comprehensive programme for restructuring the economy, the political system and the social and cultural spheres. This programme has won the wholehearted backing of Soviet people and evoked a lively international response.

A second, more challenging and crucial period has begun as we have embarked on a full-scale effort to put our plans into practice. We believe that the future of perestroika depends on two closely interrelated trends in our development - democratization of every aspect of public affairs and radical economic reform. We have set out on this course that is reflected in the theoretical concept and programme for perestroika and we shall follow it.



To be sure, we are revamping our country and our society on a strictly socialist basis, not restoring capitalism. At the same time, we are prepared to draw on the experience of other countries, especially, of course, the socialist nations.

I would advise all readers of your newspaper who want to have a good understanding of what perestroika is all about, why we need it, what its purpose is and what implications it may have for the Soviet Union and the rest of the world to read Mikhail Gorbachev's recently published book "Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World." The author shares his thoughts about perestroika, the scope of change, and the complexity, importance and revolutionary nature of our time.

Replies by Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, to Christina Jutterström, editor-in-chief of the Stockholm daily Dagens Nyheter.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Question: Previous attempts at reforming the Soviet economy in the 1960s and the 1970s can hardly be considered successful. Is there any reason to believe that current attempts of this kind will be more productive?

Answer: As I have already said, the sweeping economic change launched in this country is one of the two key components of the policy of perestroika. The word "attempt" you have used does not fit in here because the extent and scale of the current economic overhaul and those of the economic reform of the 1960s and the 1970s are incomparable.

The social and political conditions under which we are pursuing economic reform today are fundamentally different from the situation that existed in the economy and in the system of management in the preceding period. Then, the measures to streamline the economic mechanism were not complemented by an all-round democratization of society and the management sphere.

Those measures were incomplete and inconsistent. They did not reach deep into the upper echelons of management and did not gear all sections of the economy to strive for the best possible results and to apply economic levers of management. In those years we failed to blend the interests of worker collectives with the tasks set to enterprises. As a result, the mass of working people effectively stayed out of the process of change.

We have certainly taken into account all those miscalculations and blunders as we have undertaken the current reform programme. This reform is far-reaching and all-embracing in character and affects practically every aspect of life. It already has a legislative basis. In its development the reform relies on economic laws and interests which may be said to be given full effect for the first time under the socialist system of economic management. Finally - and that is the most important thing - one factor that guarantees that the current reform will not share the fate of the previous ones is the consistently unfolding process of democratization in the country. There will be no return to the past, there just can't be one, because people are actively involved in the perestroika effort.

Question: Leading Soviet economists, including Abel Aganbegyan, are for drastic reform in the pricing system, in particular for revoking most of the current subsidies on foodstuffs, rent and so on. What do you think of it? What economic and social consequences could such a reform have?

Answer: The restructuring of economic management I have mentioned above has made it necessary to also reform the price formation system as a principal component of the economic mechanism. It is essential first of all to review the prices used in settling accounts between enterprises and organizations in different economic sectors - industry, construction, agriculture, transport and communications. Without this it will be actually impossible to change over to the system of cost-accounting and self-financing on the principles of radical economic reform. As the reform is brought into effect, we shall establish economically more substantiated correlations of the prices of products of the extractive and manufacturing industries and dispel the deep-seated illusion of natural resources being inexpensive. The new prices will be aimed at promoting more rational uses of raw materials, feedstock, fuel, etc.

As to a review of consumer prices, it will affect the interests of the entire population and is therefore the sharpest socio-economic issue of the price reform. As a result of the latter, more correct correlations of prices will be established for different kinds of goods and services, and this will make it possible to stimulate improvements in the consumption pattern on the basis of growth of goods production, their better quality, and higher incomes of the population.

The main condition which has to be ensured in introducing new consumer prices is not to allow people's standard of living to drop. Moreover, it is imperative not only to maintain the standard of living, but also to ensure a rise in it for certain categories of working people so that social justice will be implemented in full. All this will require special compensational measures. The subsidies currently allocated from the budget to cover the difference between the production costs of a number of foodstuffs and their retail prices will be used to a considerable extent for this purpose.

In view of the great social and political significance of the price reform, it will be the subject of a democratic nationwide discussion.

It should be borne in mind when speaking of this issue that the social programme outlined by the party, which provides for further improvements in people's material well-being and cultural standards, will be carried out in full.

OVERCOMING INERTIA

Question: Speaking in Khabarovsk in the summer of 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev said the reform process had its opponents believing that perestroika meant sapping the very foundation of socialism. Which opponents or what kind of opponents did he have in mind and what are their arguments? Could you also make a more general comment on resistance to perestroika?

Answer: The experience of perestroika, of its initial phase, makes it possible to draw the conclusion that Soviet people are clearly aware of the need for fundamental change in every field of life, for consistently following the policy of renewal and fully bringing out the tremendous social advantages of socialism. Soviet people strongly support the perestroika effort and are joining it ever more actively.

It is safe to say that a new moral and psychological atmosphere has been created in the country and there is no political opposition to the perestroika.

Socialism, as is known, removes antagonistic contradictions in society. But this absolutely true tenet may by no means be understood as a complete absence of differences between the interests of individual groups and sections of society, work collectives of individual enterprises and those of the national economy as a whole. These contradictions do exist and must be seen and taken into account in day-to-day activities.

Now that the process of perestroika is gathering momentum and cutting across into ever expanding areas of public life, it is, naturally, encountering certain resistance.

It should not be forgotten in the first place that under excessive centralism there have taken shape certain stereotypes and theoretical dogmas. Economic and social relations engendered by specific historical conditions were viewed by many as the true and only possible image of socialist society and any deviation from those dogmas was viewed as a departure from the principles of socialism.

Further, the armchair system of management swaddled up shopfloor initiative, prompted play-it-safe attitudes, blunted the sense of responsibility, and cultivated an atmosphere of indifference.

The force of inertia, as is known, is very powerful, and it may not be underestimated either in the social or in the economic spheres. It is perfectly obvious that the mentality and ideas of many millions of people cannot be changed radically at once. This will take time.

Another counteracting factor is conservatism. Many people are mistrustful of everything that is new and unaccustomed and, even if they do not resist it directly, they tend at least to take a wait-and-see attitude.

There is also another category of people. They are wholly for perestroika, but cannot yet work in the new manner, they have to learn how.

No less harm to perestroika can be done by avant-gardism, reluctance to reckon with objective processes, undue haste, and a striving to accomplish final results right away, right this very minute, although this would first require creating certain objective prerequisites and, of course, time.

Conservatism, passivity and avant-gardism are perhaps the main stumbling blocks that will have to be cleared out of the path of perestroika. And the most important thing in these efforts will be to further promote democracy, glasnost (openness), criticism and self-criticism, and work to educate the working people and foster a new public mentality. The faster and more effective this work goes, the better the results of perestroika will be in the economic field. So these two processes go together.

NO GOING BACK

Question: Perestroika does not boil down to just economic reform in the Soviet Union. Perestroika also covers political and psychological change directly in people's minds. How would you respond to those who are not yet prepared to change their "inner structures" and say, as some readers do in their letters to newspapers: "Before determining our attitude to the ongoing reform and offering it any solid support, let's wait and see whether it strikes root"?

Answer: Such a complicated process as perestroika objectively involves a struggle between the new and the old. There are also people who are "contemplating."

We are telling those who are hesitating and biding their time that there will be no return to the past. This would mean finding ourselves in a precrisis situation again, with increasing stagnation in the economy and political affairs, social corrosion, spiritual callousness and apathy.

As Mikhail Gorbachev has said, "there's simply no other way. We may not retreat and have nowhere to retreat."

We are telling those who show uncertainty and indecision that it is only through perestroika, acceleration and renewal that we shall achieve a drastically new level of Soviet society and bring out the immense social resources of socialism and its possibilities as a system of real humanism serving and ennobling man so that he will feel in control as a contributing factor in society.

It is only in this way that a future of peace and well-being can be ensured for these and succeeding generations of Soviet people.

We are telling those who dillydally and lack initiative that they have fallen behind the requirements of the times. The objectives of perestroika can only be reached by thoroughly promoting the activeness and creativity of the masses through the effective involvement of everyone in realizing what has been planned. The human factor is the key to all change. Already now we can see real changes in people's minds, in their sentiments and actions. This is largely a result of purposeful explanatory work, vocational training and the very atmosphere of glasnost. Officials proving unable to actively translate the ideas of perestroika into life are making way for more competent and energetic people. This is facilitated to a large extent by the election of managerial personnel based on democratization in public affairs.

LENIN'S CONCEPT OF SOCIALISM AND STALIN

Question: Perestroika means in many ways a divorce from the society whose foundation was laid by Josef Stalin before and after 1930 (excessive centralization of the economy and economic planning). Against the background of today's reform, what do you think of Stalin's role as the economic and social creator of society?

Answer: I would first of all like to stress that the foundation of Soviet society was laid under the guidance of Vladimir Lenin, and it is on this basis that today's society is still developing. In the period when Stalin was at the helm, a serious aberration - a departure from Lenin's principles - took place, resulting in the armchair system of party-and-state guidance over the nation.

The complex and thoroughgoing change in the management system in the 1920s and the 1930s was caused by both objective and subjective factors. The decisive role in that process was played by the vital need to quickly overcome the country's technological and economic backwardness, a need made ever more urgent by internal and external circumstances.It was possible to achieve a high economic growth rate only by mobilizing all material resources to the maximum in order to fulfil the set tasks and boost the share of accumulation in the national income. In point of fact, that was an economic system featuring the traits of a mobilization economy.

Excessive central control was further tightened during the war years, and also preserved during the period of rehabilitating the national economy after the war. That was an objective need.

But in the following years, when there no longer was such a need, the management system, alas, was not updated thoroughly enough to meet the new conditions of development.

In speaking of the nature of direction over social and economic development in the 1930s and subsequent years, and the role of Stalin, it should be said that the issue cannot be reduced to the activities of a single person. The whole package of measures that determined the structure and methods of economic management cannot be linked to one man, no matter how significant his role was. Observing the principle of a historical approach to establishing the truth, one should see and comprehensively analyze the entire range of objective and subjective factors behind the emergence of the system of running the economy that asserted itself in this country in the 1930s.

One should not ignore the path traversed by our country and its economy which has progressed in a historically short span of time from the wooden plough and underdeveloped industry to harnessing the atom and scaling the heights of space science and technology. But neither may we forget about the gross blunders, the deviations made in those years from the principles of socialism, and about the unjustified and unpardonable repression.

Question: In more general terms, don't you believe that perestroika, above all, in political and politico-psychological respect, presupposes a historical break with Stalinism? More specifically, can one expect the official rehabilitation, say, of the old Bolsheviks convicted at the Moscow trials in 1937?

Answer: We have a wise saying: "Measure thrice and cut once." You are talking about a historical break with Stalinism. But before deciding on surgery, one must know the precise diagnosis. With what, strictly speaking, should this break be made? It is no secret that the notions of Stalinism in the West do not coincide with our assessments of that period in the history of the U.S.S.R. If by this one implies violations of socialist legality or, say, the armchair economic management, then here we have both "measured and cut." But in the West, Stalinism is sometimes equated with socialism. In this connection let me repeat one of the key formulas of our perestroika: there must be more socialism.

Perestroika is a decisive repudiation of everything that is outmoded, erroneous, harmful and that holds back our further advances and impedes the full utilization of the potential which our society possesses. But perestroika relies on the sturdy foundation of the society built by the Soviet people in the decades since the October revolution, and it takes into account and uses everything valuable created by the Soviet people under the guidance of the party.

Giving a principled and unprejudiced assessment of the personality of Stalin, we proceed from the premise that Stalin cannot be equated with the entire party and with the millions of ordinary people whose commitment to Lenin's ideas and the ideals of the revolution was not shaken in the most gruelling and tragic periods of our history.

Resolute and consistent steps to completely restore Lenin's concept of socialism and the Leninist style and methods of party work have been undertaken by the 27th CPSU Congress.

As far as the specific issues of rehabilitation for defendants at the political trials in 1937-39 are concerned, many of those people, as is known, have already been rehabilitated. They have been cleared of the slanderous, falsified charges and reinstated as honest persons. The process is continuing. It will take some time to take another look at all the circumstances of the illegal acts of repression in the 1930s. The party's Central Committee has formed a special commission for the thorough studying of all instances of illegality and arbitrariness in the 1930s and subsequent years.

A SYSTEM OF INCENTIVES

Question: In connection with perestroika in the Soviet Union much is being said about the need for a greater personal responsibility in the economic field. This applies to both managerial personnel and the shop floor at government-owned enterprises and people working outside the state sector (cooperatives and individual labour projects). What kind of economic, social and psychological obstacles have to be surmounted for the whole generation of people used to centralized economic control to pluck up the courage to display such initiative? What precisely is being done to educate the entire nation in this respect?

Answer: I do not agree that we have a whole generation of people not daring to display economic initiative, and I could give many specific examples disproving this view. It is true, however, that the state's overly close guardianship of low-performance factories has led to certain categories of working people acquiring a sponger's mentality which sometimes develops into social passivity. This is why we shall indeed have to reeducate part of the people, inculcating in them a psychology of economic responsibility, initiative and efficiency-minded attitudes.

The prime need is to establish a powerful system of incentives motivating all personnel to show economic responsibility and to work fruitfully. This requires that every worker should feel really in control in his workplace, collective and society as a whole. Socio-economic conditions are being created in the country under which this factor will come into full play, and the most important thing is democratization in public life and the changeover to the predominantly economic levers of management.

Worker collectives have been granted broad rights in planning production and social development, managing economic activities, and electing executives at different levels. These rights have been sealed in the Law on the State Enterprise. The rate of plant modernization and the extent to which social requirements are fulfilled have been made dependent on the performance of the given work collective. Such forms of organizing and remunerating labour (for example, the team contract system), under which democratism can be felt most directly in deciding on business matters and income distribution, are being widely promoted.

The economy is being geared to meeting social needs of a perceptibly greater degree, and resources are being redirected to satisfying the requirements of the social sphere. This reflects perestroika's general focus on man, his needs and interests, and makes it possible to use these interests fully as a factor for increasing economic initiative.

Great significance in supplying people's current needs flexibly and promptly is being attached to making extensive use of individual and cooperative labour projects. Their promotion by no means substitutes for the state sector and is meant instead to actively supplement it, especially where it is essential to reckon with regional conditions and use local resources in a greater measure.

These forms of work are quickly catching on and people are joining in readily. The country now has as many as 10,000 different cooperatives with a total of over 100,000 members.

Much significance is being attached also to the economic education of working people. The idea is to equip the broad masses of workers with economic knowledge enabling them to deal with issues likely to confront them under the new system of economic management.

The logic of all our actions stems from the fact that man, as the purpose of economic development and its principal motive force, is at the heart of perestroika and the entire economic policy. This is why the issue of activating the human factor goes beyond the bounds of enhancing the economic initiative of workers. The aim is to make certain that perestroika gives the working people opportunities for bringing out their aptitudes and talents, for a thorough development of the individual, and for elevating human dignity - all of which has not yet been known in the history of civilization.

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Question: During the past few years and months the arms race and arms control have been the central issues of international relations, especially in regard to contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States. How do you see Soviet-American relations today and their prospects in the near future?

Answer: A review of the past several decades shows that throughout all the postwar years mankind has been looking for ways of checking the arms race and reducing arms.

Disarmament still remains a dominant issue in international relations, including Soviet-American relations. This reflects the reality of the present-day world in which huge stocks of both nuclear and non-nuclear arms have built up. Common sense has made it clear to us that we have entered a qualitatively new stage. Never before has mankind faced the choice to either perish or survive. In the past no war, despite the suffering and destruction it brought, endangered the very existence of humankind, the whole of our civilization. Today such a threat is quite real.

Humanity must also free itself of the arms burden to solve its global problems. A joint search for new economic order is needed which will take into account the interests of all countries on an equal basis. The way to the establishment of such an order lies, in our opinion, in disarmament for development.

An increasing amount of people have come to understand that a nation is unable to ensure its security through military-technical means - by its own efforts or jointly with its allies. The axiom "if you want peace, prepare for war" has become completely outdated. No longer valid is the dictum of Karl Clausewitz that "war is a continuation of policy by other, namely, violent means."

What is needed today therefore is a new political thinking based on universal human values and the firm belief that national security should not be achieved at the expense of others.

Only in this way can mankind be freed of the danger of self-destruction. In practical terms, this means the need to make the transition from the arms race to real disarmament. The Soviet-American INF treaty, signed during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United States, was the first step in this direction, the first brake in the slide to nuclear war.

The Washington talks between American and Soviet leaders have also opened favourable prospects for a drastic cut in the strategic offensive weapons. This is a key issue in the Soviet-American relations and in halting the arms race. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it would like the agreement on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, under strict compliance with the ABM treaty, to be carried into effect at the earliest possible time.

Soviet-American relations have improved - they are more dynamic, mutual trust has increased. The agreements reached in Washington inspire hopes for further progress. We are firmly determined to continue improving our relations with the United States in every sphere. But this should not and could not be a one-way street. It is a two-way process.

The state of Soviet-U.S. relations is clearly important for the international situation as a whole. At the same time I want to remind you what has already been said many times: the Soviet Union does not see the world in the light of its relations with the United States. Our relations with other countries, both large and small, are likewise valuable.

AFGHANISTAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF

Question: What are the prospects for the settlement of the Afghan conflict and how do you see the possibility of withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan?

Answer: The Soviet Union wants to settle the Afghan question by political means and fully backs Kabul's programme for national reconciliation. The basic condition for settlement is, first of all, the ending of foreign armed interference in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan that would make the evacuation of Soviet troops possible.

The policy of national reconciliation is neither a slogan nor tactical manoeuvre, but an actual programme of practical measures to bring all Afghans together in the aim of ending the bloodshed and securing peace in their country.

Political settlement is not a remote prospect but an objective that can be achieved in the nearest future. At the representative Loya Jirgah, or great assembly held in Kabul late in November 1987, President Muhammad Najibullah announced the decision, reached with the Soviet Union, to pull out troops within 12 months. This period can be reduced, he noted, if further progress is made in national reconciliation. Already now there is no Soviet troops in twelve out of Afghanistan's 29 provinces.

Thus, you can see for yourself that, when talking about its political decision to withdraw troops, the Soviet Union backs up words with actions.

We want to see Afghanistan as an independent and non-aligned state, friendly not only to the Soviet Union, but to other neighbouring states and to all countries of the world as well.

The Soviet Union is prepared to do everything in its power for an early and just solution of the Afghan problem. But I want to stress once more than settlement can become possible only if foreign interference in Afghan affairs is stopped completely.

Question: Would you comment on the situation in the Persian Gulf and on the Iran-Iraq war? What levers do the Soviet Union and the United States have to help bring that war to an end?

Answer: The situation in the Persian Gulf remains tense and fraught with further serious complications. Unfortunately, the flames of the senseless Iran-Iraq war have yet to be extinguished.

As is known, the U.N. Security Council has unanimously passed resolution 598. The Soviet Union is facilitating the implementation of this resolution and contributing to the U.N. Secretary-General's efforts for a peaceful political settlement of the conflict, which presents certain difficulties. In connection with this, the U.S.S.R. is ready to consider the problem of taking certain measures against the party which refuses to fulfil resolution 598 to help the U.N. Secretary-General achieve his goal.

The concentration of naval forces of the United States and a number of other NATO countries in the Persian Gulf is not conducive to relaxing the dangerous tension in that region. Moreover, it is complicating the situation. As is known, the Soviet Union has proposed sending a U.N. naval force there. The implementation of this proposal, which does not infringe on the interests and rights of any country, would, I think, lessen tension in the Gulf considerably and facilitate to end the Iran-Iraq war.

U.S.S.R.-SWEDEN

Question: It has been nearly 15 years since the last visit to Sweden by a Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. The relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union have gone through several grave crises in this period. How would you evaluate these relations today?

Answer: I would like to stress first of all that our neighbouring countries have a rich, many centuries-old experience in relations. They have not developed smoothly the entire time. Indeed, nearly 15 years have elapsed since the visit of Alexei Kosygin to your country. However, I do not think that the Soviet-Swedish relations "have gone through several grave crises" in this time, although there have been periods of coolness and even light frosts.

It should be noted immediately that we are not to blame for these atmospheric phenomena. Swedish-Soviet relations are not developing in a void. At one time our relations were adversely influenced by a general worsening of the international situation. Unfortunately, they have been and still are influenced by hostile circles, the adversaries of a good-neighbour policy with the Soviet Union.

Much harm to our relations was done by a campaign launched in the autumn of 1981 after a Soviet submarine had by accident sailed into Swedish waters, an incident which we sincerely regret. The repercussions of this groundless campaign are still heard today, although Moscow gave the appropriate exhaustive explanations long ago.

The Soviet Union has always sought to maintain good-neighbour relations with Sweden. Meetings at a high political level have become a feature of our postwar ties. In 1978, for the first time in the history of our bilateral relations, the Swedish king, Carl XVI Gustaf, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union. There have been regular exchanges of visits by the heads of our governments. Parliamentary ties and contacts between our foreign ministers have assumed a stable character.

The foreign ministries hold political consultations, and practical ties are maintained in various branches by the ministries of our countries. Mutually advantageous contacts in the fields of science, technology, culture and sports are quite extensive. Useful work is being done, in my opinion, by the intergovernmental Soviet-Swedish commission for economic, scientific and technical cooperation and by its numerous branches of working groups.

Trade and economic ties, based on the long-term programme for economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation in 1981-90 and on the long-term trade agreement effective till 1995, are also characterized by a certain stability. Although the Soviet Union's percentage in Swedish foreign trade is small, there are, in our opinion, large untapped reserves in this sphere.

Soviet-Swedish ties rest on a solid contractual basis. Many intergovernment and interdepartment agreements regulating our ties in various fields have been concluded and are working successfully. Several more important agreements are to be signed during my visit to Sweden in January 1988.

We remember well the official visit of Premier Ingvar Carlsson to the Soviet Union in April 1986. This visit enabled us to continue our personal acquaintance with the premier. We had first met under sad circumstances – at the funeral of Olof Palme, who had been assassinated.

At the talks in Moscow we agreed that a further expansion of Soviet-Swedish relations in political, economic, cultural and other spheres is beneficial to peace and security in Europe. We confirmed our desire to use the available opportunities for promoting the cooperation and relations between our countries and extending them to new areas.

The recent past has shown that we are successfully advancing along this correct path. In our opinion, the Soviet-Swedish relations are characterized today by a certain degree of dynamism, stability and good-neighbour policy. This is largely due to the fact that we hold identical views on a number of currently vital issues, first and foremost on the issue of averting the nuclear threat.

Question: The commander-in-chief of the Swedish armed forces regularly informs the public that violations of the country's territorial waters by foreign submarines continue. The national identity of the intruders could not be established during the past years. However, a great part of the Swedish public and media seem to believe, as before, that the Soviet Union is connected to these violations. What could you tell this part of the Swedish public?

Answer: I would like to tell this part of the Swedish public and, for that matter, all Swedish citizens that the Soviet Union has and had nothing to do with the above-mentioned violations, except the unpremeditated venture of a Soviet submarine into Swedish territorial waters in October 1981. The Soviet naval ships have been given clear instructions not to approach Swedish territorial waters, and they strictly abide by these instructions.

It would apparently be good for everyone concerned if what is actually happening in Swedish territorial waters is finally cleared up.

As for the Soviet Union, it has always respected the independence of Sweden, its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

SECURITY CONCEPT AND NORTHERN EUROPE

Question: Security experts in the North European countries sometimes express fears that the American-Soviet INF agreement will increase tension in Northern Europe, especially in the Baltic area. What assurances can the Soviet Union give to dispel such fears, or what commitments can it make with this goal?

Answer: As you can see, the INF treaty is not fraught with the danger of the growth of tension in any region. On the contrary, it considerably reduces this danger. The signing of the Washington treaty is the first practical step in building a world without nuclear weapons. It is a truly historic event, a major new landmark in international development. The elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles and strict verification measures envisaged in this treaty accord with the interests of all nations, including those in Northern Europe, and enhance the level of security and trust on a global scale. The essentially new situation facilitates progress in many seemingly insoluble problems, including those affecting the North European region.

We also have fears that tension may increase. However, the reason for such fears is not the treaty but the intensified activity of certain military and political circles in NATO who are trying to disregard it. It is no secret that ways are being sought to "compensate" for the loss of Pershing and land-based cruise missiles by building up nuclear and conventional armaments precisely in the northern waters and air space. It is no secret either that U.S. officials recently held talks on this subject in a number of West and North European countries.

The Soviet leadership hopes that our partners at the Geneva negotiations will adhere to a realistic position devoid of any desire to gain unilateral advantages and consciously mislead their own people and world opinion.

Furthermore, I would like to stress that the Washington accord on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles is only the first step in unravelling the numerous Gordian knots of the arms race. The Soviet Union and the United States have already started talks on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.

It is to be hoped that the Vienna review meeting of the Helsinki conference will at last draw up a mandate for further talks on confidence-building measures, security and disarmament in Europe. All this inspires optimism and indicates that the peoples and governments have serious intentions to create favourable conditions for a more stable and secure peace at a much lower level of nuclear and conventional armaments. We think, in particular, that disarmament measures on a global and European scale will put the question of establishing a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe on a practical level.

The qualitatively new situation that appeared in the world after the Soviet-U.S. talks in Washington can and should prove favourable to the growth of security and reduction of military activity in the North European region and the adjoining seas. Concrete Soviet proposals or, more precisely, a whole set of proposals for achieving this objective have been formulated in the speech delivered by Mikhail Gorbachev in Murmansk on October 1 last year.

This is our current programme of action. The Soviet Union is determined to advance towards a practical realization of this programme. We hope to see in the North Europeans partners interested in dialogue and cooperation, for we share the common goal - to actually make the North a region of peace and creative endeavour.

DELIMITATION TALKS

Question: For a long time Sweden and the Soviet Union have carried on negotiations on delimitation in the Baltic Sea. It is believed in the West that the present uncertainty is most likely advantageous to the Soviet Union from the standpoint of security and the fishing industry, and that for this reason Moscow is not interested in an early agreement with Sweden on the question concerned. How would you comment on this opinion?

Answer: The idea that Moscow is interested in continued uncertainty over delimitation in the Baltic Sea swings wide of the mark; someone has specially thought it up.

First, regarding considerations of security. What is in question is not the demarcation of frontiers or the acquisition or loss of territory. It is the delimitation of marine economic zones.

Second, regarding the interests of fishing. The argument that Moscow is not interested in the settlement of this question does not withstand criticism. On the contrary, the depletion of fishing resources in the disputed area as a result of the continuing rapacious activity of third countries has harmful consequences for the fishermen of the Soviet Baltic republics and, it should be assumed, for the Swedish fishermen too.

In short, the Soviet Union is highly interested in the fair delimitation of marine areas with its Baltic neighbour as soon as possible.

Question: The head of the Soviet delegation at the talks on delimitation in the Baltic Sea pointed out in an interview to Dagens Nyheter last May that both the Soviet Union and Sweden have an international legal basis for their fundamental positions at these talks.

Do you think that Sweden recognizes in the same way the international legal basis of the Soviet position at the talks?

How, in the Soviet opinion, can a compromise be reached at the talks with initial positions of both parties being equal from the legal point of view?

Answer: The international legal position of the Soviet Union at the talks with Sweden on the delimitation of economic zones in the Baltic Sea rests on the principle of justice set forth in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. This principle envisages that all factors operating in the region of delimitation should be fully and comprehensively taken into account. The role of fishing for the population of the Soviet Baltic republics in the region subject to delimitation is an important factor in this case. It would be unfair to ignore the economic interests of the Soviet Union, and Sweden too, in the final delimitation of their economic zones in the Baltic Sea.

We believe that this complicated drawn out problem can be solved only by compromise. As is known, Soviet and Swedish experts are now looking for a mutually acceptable settlement. Let's wait for the results.

Question: During the 1980s Soviet scholars and political commentators have repeatedly criticized Sweden for its, as they claim, heavy dependence on Western, mainly U.S., civilian and military technology. What do you think about this criticism and, in the light of what was said above, Sweden's policy of neutrality?

Answer: I would like to say first of all that the Soviet Union respects the Swedish policy of neutrality. We are convinced that it is an important factor of peace and stability not only in Northern Europe but also on the European continent as a whole. The concept of neutrality drawn up in your country presupposes the desire to build defences by relying first of all on one's own forces. This is a domestic concern fo the Swedes, their legitimate right to determine their security policy. In the meantime, Soviet scholars and political commentators are also free to give their views on domestic and foreign policies of Sweden.

Now about Sweden's dependence on foreign civilian and military technology. It is a well-known, actually existing and, to a varying degree, apparently inevitable factor in the present-day world with its developed division of labour.

It should be noted at the same time that the current certain dependence of Sweden on some of the West's hi-tech industries has been used to draw the country into the COCOM system. This, in its turn, impedes the growth of Swedish trade with socialist countries. In general, restrictions, discriminations and boycotts of various kinds - these hangovers of the cold war - run counter to the efforts of the world community for improving the international situation, the world economic situation. and infringe the interests of a wide range of countries.

PROSPECTS OF BUSINESS COOPERATION

Question. What are the prospects of trade relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden? Will you, in the course of your visit to Sweden, discuss any concrete projects for cooperation and, if you do, what projects?

Answer. It should be noted first of all that in the postwar years Soviet-Swedish trade has been characterized by a steady growth. Among the important contributing factors are traditional economic ties and the geographic proximity of our countries. I think our countries have all the objective conditions for consolidating this tendency of growth in the remaining period of the 20th century and for carrying it over to the 21st century.

We are taking only initial steps in this direction. For instance, an agreement was reached on the joint construction of an agro-industrial complex in the Leningrad region during a recent visit to Sweden by a delegation from the State Agro-Industrial Committee of the U.S.S.R. Talks are being conducted on a number of other projects.

Vast possibilities exist today for an expansion of Soviet-Swedish cooperation. We are seeking to develop trade both by improving traditional exchanges and by introducing new, progresssive forms of cooperation. As you know, many Soviet ministries and a large number of big industrial amalgamations have been allowed to conclude deals directly in the world market. They can establish direct business ties with Swedish firms. We hope this will favourably influence both the volume and quality of our commercial ties.

It should be said, however, that in the matter of establishing joint ventures the Soviet Union expected more initiative and enterprise on the part of the Swedish business circles than we see today. I personally know many Swedish businessmen. They are very enterprising people who are willing to cooperate with our country. It can therefore be supposed that some psychological barriers have arisen in their approach to joint ventures, and these barriers must be removed as soon as possible.

To a certain extent, this was possibly explained by the fact that "white spots" impeding a broad expansion of joint ventures remained in our legislation until recently. This is understandable because joint ventures is a new form of cooperation for us too. Therefore, in September 1987 the Soviet Union adopted new decrees providing more flexible conditions for the operation of joint enterprises. This form of cooperation has a substantial potential capable of appreciably enhancing the level of trade and economic ties between our countries.

During my visit to Sweden I shall try, jointly with its leaders, to give fresh impetus to relations between our countries on the whole. In the course of planned contacts we shall also discuss the concrete issues of trade and economic relations, in both traditional commercial ties and in the use of new forms of cooperation.

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Waking up to reality

Strauss in Moscow: an unusual visit

LEV BEZYMENSKY

Franz Josef Strauss in Moscow? The politician whose name evokes in any of us definite - mostly negative - associations? A man who had so often come under fire from the Soviet press? And not only the Soviet press, for that matter. I myself have also described the political programme and activity of the leader of the Bavarian Christian Social Union in no uncertain terms as extremist, conservative, reactionary and even... I'll stop at that.

This is not to say that now we must let bygones be bygones. Far from it. There is no forgetting the past. This visit is hardly an occasion for changing our minds about the guest from Bavaria and for reclassifying him as a long-time champion of cooperation with the Soviet Union, as a fighter for peace and a convinced adherent of détente. Therefore, may it come as no surprise to the Prime Minister of Bavaria if, upon returning from Moscow, he still hears an occasional sharp remark directed at him. If he deserves it, that is. Unless we should again be compelled to apologize (as was the case with a most reputable Soviet paper once) for attacking the Bavarian politician for a statement he has not made...

Let us discuss something else: why has the visit taken place at all, why have the official reports on Herr Strauss' talks in Moscow been couched in such positive terms? During his talk with Mikhail Gorbachev, the two sides turned out to hold common views on many international issues: on the need to recognize the existing realities, on ruling out war from the practice of interstate relations, on the role of disarmament, on the importance of promoting the relationships between the F.R.G. and the U.S.S.R. All this sounds axiomatic enough, I agree - but not in this particular case.

There has been a school of thought that conservative Western politicians are quicker than the "Leftist" politicians (say, Social Democrats) to find a common language with the Communists. Allusions are made to the historic Rapallo Treaty of 1922 when the Catholic Party of the "Centre" in Germany acted in its country's national interests, while German Social Democrats buried themselves in the trenches of anti-Sovietism. I had often heard this argument in Munich, along with the question of why Strauss was not invited to Moscow. Strauss was the man to come to terms with, I had been told.

But history does not just repeat itself. The record of the 1970s and the F.R.G.'s "Eastern policy" went to show that the conservative forces remained slaves to old notions. On the other hand, Willy Brandt, a Social Democrat, accomplished a historic breakthrough into a new Europe. (Incidentally, this did not prevent Social Democrats from losing both poitical capital and power in the subsequent years).

So much for historical parallels. What really matters is not a politician's party affiliation, but his ability to "decode" the signs of the times. This ability does not always come easy. Let's be frank about it: many prominent statesmen of the West, the F.R.G. included, had found their way to Moscow much earlier. Moscow is hospitable to those who wish to talk in earnest. Herein, I think, lies the key to understanding the rather down-to-earth motives for this extraordinary visit which attracted a great deal of attention in the F.R.G. and in the rest of the world, including, of course, the Soviet Union.

Ours is the time of many foreign policy notions being broken, of a change-over to a new political culture in international relations. Admittedly, it is easier to stick to old notions, both in the West and in the East. It was easier to reiterate the hackneyed tirades on the "red threat" than to face the realities of the modern world, such as the reality of there being two German states. For us, too, it was perhaps easier to rebuke Strauss than to analyze the complicated political and psychological background against which the forces he represents operate. The need for new thinking is universally recognized and means not only new diplomatic actions. It also means the ability to talk with one another instead of conducting a "one-man dialogue." Now that mankind's very existence is at stake, it is politically imperative that contacts be made and discussions conducted with any political party, if this contributes to the solution of common problems, to overcoming prejudices and clearing up misunderstandings.

This is of critical importance to Europe which stands on the threshold of important decisions. The world is looking to the old continent to see whether it succeeds in breaking the vicious circle of "military deterrents" (of which Strauss has always been an adherent) and contribute to nuclear and conventional disarmament. The F.R.G. has an important role to play here, and its relations with the Soviet Union go far beyond the bilateral problems which were high on the agenda of Bavarian Prime Minister's discussions in Moscow. "Knowing Bavaria does not mean knowing the rest of the F.R.G., but if you know nothing about Bavaria, you know nothing about the F.R.G.," Strauss remarked in a Moscow interview. This is probably true. So let us see what headway the political forces of the F.R.G.make towards the consideration and understanding of the realities of our epoch.

The orbital peace mission goes on

One of the longest space missions in history has come to an end. Yuri Romanenko, Alexander Alexandrov and Anatoly Levchenko have returned to Earth. Musa Manarov and Vladimir Titov have taken over from them. For the first time ever the crew of the Mir station has been changed in orbit.

Quite recently a different procedure had been employed. A crew would be launched into space, complete a mission, and would return. Between missions the orbital stations operated in an unmanned mode.

Deputy mission control head Victor Blagov explains that this procedure needed optimization. The crew that was leaving the station would de-activate the onboard systems and instruments, and the crew that took over from them would re-activate them. It is of course much more rational to hand over the onboard systems in a manned flight. Making the idea practicable, however, called for a restructuring of virtually every ground support service.

On the way back from the space centre. From right to left: Y. Romanenko, A. Alexandrov, A. Leonov.

TASS photo

Cosmonauts have a bigger work load as well, since they are now given both individual jobs and assignments as a whole team. At the final stage Yuri Romanenko had more work to do than any other spaceman. He spent a total of 326 days at zero gravity, a new space endurance record. One may wonder whether missions that last so long are really necessary. There is no simple answer to that question. Strictly speaking, such missions are not really necessary for studies that concentrate on near space, where the optimal duration of a mission is 3-4 months. However, from the point of view of future missions, testing space endurance is a vital need, a view shared by both Soviet and American experts. For instance, America's woman astronaut Sally Ride believes that studies of human endurance in space in the 1990s will be of crucial importance, and she is actively involved in long-term space planning. A NASA expert John Billingham says: "We know the major physiological changes that take place over two to four weeks (of a space mission), but we do not understand the mechanism underlying these changes." Nor do they know how far these changes might go on a long mission.

Investigating the effects of zero gravity is considered by both countries to be of key importance in preparing for interplanetary missions. For millions of years the human organism has been bound by gravity. Exposure to zero gravity in orbit leads to considerable changes in its functions - the human body tries to get rid of "excess" fluid, the heart pumps less blood, the muscles degenerate, and the bones lose calcium. There are ways of dealing with the effects of zero gravity. Onboard simulators and G-suits are used and diets rich in mineral salts are kept. Special drugs have been developed to help cosmonauts stay fit. But more experience is needed, which is what the crews working in the Mir station are now endeavouring to do.

Anatoly Levchenko had a very special job to do during his brief, a week-long mission to Mir. New transport crafts are now being developed for operation inside and outside of the atmosphere. Anatoly Levchenko is a crack test pilot and, just like his colleagues in similar programmes, needs some specific knowledge of space.

The three men who have returned to Earth will now go through exhaustive medical testing, rest, and then participate in processing the data and research materials obtained. Newcomers to the station have already started on a programme of experiments in biotechnology, astrophysics, Earth resource studies, and medicine.

A few years ago cosmonaut Vladimir Dzhanibekov said to me: "There can be no full-scale space exploration without orbital stations. Soviet space experts realized this a long time ago, and the Americans are bound to reach the same conclusion." I had my doubts about what he said, but the latest events in the United States seem to confirm his prognostication: there are growing signs that over the next decade an orbital station will be central to the U.S. space programme. The U.S. administration gave the go-ahead for the station in 1984, and the system is expected to be operational towards the end of the decade.

There is current debate in the United States on whether or not the project will stifle other scientific programmes. Its estimated cost ranges between 8 and 30 billion dollars, a lot of money, especially since funds for the studies of other planets by unmanned probes are being cut. In the 1970s the Shuttle programme set a precedent when it consumed the funds originally earmarked for scientific projects.

There are people who tend to view space stations as a means of competing for leadership in space. To remain in the lead, NASA believes, the U.S. must put a manned station in orbit.

The United States intends to involve Japan, the European Space Agency and Canada in developing separate units for the station. But they are in no hurry to join the programme, being concerned, above all, according to press reports, about the prospect of orbital labs being converted into combat stations.

"Much larger orbital complexes will soon be put into orbit," Yuri Romanenko says. "Solar power plants and high-output energy repeaters may spring up in orbit, and international studies for peaceful purposes will be expanded."

One would very much like to share his hope that reason will prevail and an end will be put once and for all to plans to take weapons into space.

MIKHAIL CHERNYSHOV

The pulse of a nation

The Americans and the outside world: a review of recent opinion polls

IGOR MALASHENKO

Following the Washington summit nearly 75 per cent of American citizens have voiced their approval of the Reagan Administration's approach to the U.S.S.R. and called for the ratification of the INF treaty. Is this a passing euphoria or a long-term trend? Can one expect today's sentiments of the American public to continue to facilitate the improvement of relations between the two nations in the future?

Unfortunately in the past, American public opinion has on many occasions changed very quickly. Now that the public tends to exert a growing influence on foreign policy, which used to be the preserve of professional politicians and diplomats, it is necessary to assess this influence objectively.

The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations conducts one of the most authoritative polls on foreign policy once every four years. Its latest report "American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1987" is of special interest because it presents a preview of changes in the U.S. public mentality during the Reagan Administration's conservative foreign policy.

A tough line

The activities of President Reagan himself show how important it is to consider prevailing public sentiment. Relying on professional advisers he skilfully took advantage of public opinion trends of the late 1970s to gain his political ends. Let us recall some of them. The U.S. hostage crisis in Iran continued for many months and was seen in the country as unprecedented national humiliation. The events in Afghanistan evoked a surge of anti-Soviet feelings and, combined with the feeling that the United States was losing ground, resulted in an increase in chauvinistic sentiment. The polls conducted in 1980 recorded an unprecedented growth of public support to an increase in military spending and a tougher line on the international scene. This was partly a response to the inconsistent policies of the Carter administration and also a result of right-wing conservative propaganda.

Having assumed office, President Reagan and his team tried hard to promote public opinion trends that suited their interests. How successful have they been? Attitudes towards military spending has gone through a change, but not in the administration's favour. Only 20 per cent of Americans support the idea of increasing military expenditures today, while 23 per cent support cuts in military spending. President Reagan has made more progress in influencing members of his own party, though: 29 per cent of the Republicans are in favour of increasing U.S. military power, compared to 14 per cent of the Democrats. Contenders for the presidency will no doubt bear this in mind, as they have to take into consideration the sentiments of members of their parties and at the same time try not to lose what votes they may pick up in the rival camp.

Most Americans polled (54 per cent) favour maintaining military spending at today's level. This does not correspond to the Administration's policy of increasing the military budget, yet it also falls short of reverting to the situation in the early 1970s when most Americans favoured cuts in military spending.

How can this evolution of public opinion be explained? Let us go back a few years. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, influenced by reports of various "setbacks" suffered by the United States on the world scene and a powerful propaganda campaign of the alleged Soviet threat, the typical U.S. citizen came to believe that his country had grown dangerously weak in the face of a growing Soviet military potential.

The idea that the United States was now "world power No. 2" seemed so abhorrent that many supported President Reagan's call for "restoring" U.S. military strength, but that sentiment was shortlived. Only 17 per cent of those polled now believe that the U.S.S.R. is militarily stronger than the U.S.A., 28 per cent believe that the U.S.A. is stronger, and 48 per cent believe that the two countries are roughly equal, compared to 26 per cent who held the latter view in 1979.

Paradoxical as it may seem, it was the Reagan administration itself that brought about this change in public opinion, having beefed up the U.S. military muscle to such an extent that many Americans came to view it as more than enough. They now believe that the job has been done and oppose the idea of more military expenditures.

The changing opinion about the state of military balance is relevant to U.S. public assessment of the role played by their country on the world scene. Forty-one per cent of those polled expressed the view that in recent years the United States has become a stronger world leader, compared to 26 per cent who hold the opposite view. Five years ago 27 per cent of those polled were optimistic about the U.S. position in the world, while 44 per cent said the country was losing leadership. In other words, the Americans have practically been cured of the "weak America" syndrome which public mentality possessed in the late 1970s and which gave rise to sentiment in favour of a tougher foreign policy.

The White House has indeed done a great deal to induce the public at home to become more self-assertive and demonstrate that the President has promoted the international standing of the United States. America has asserted itself, but how much of this has increased domestic support for Washington's confrontational foreign policy moves?

Cold-war values

Let us consider the approach to Soviet-American relations. Public opinion has naturally been swayed by a policy of competition and confrontation with the Soviet Union, to which the administration has until recently been so stubbornly committed. Fifty-seven per cent of Americans still believe that "containing Communism," a classical cold war attitude, is a very important foreign policy goal. At the same time the overwhelming majority

of 80 per cent favour arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. There is also a strong sentiment in favour of promoting Soviet-American cooperation in other areas.

This contradiction does not appear to be accidental. The Americans are well aware of the need to keep peace in this age of nuclear missiles, but at the same time, many of them tend to continue to view the Soviet Union in the suspicious and even hostile way carried over from the cold war. The following is highly significant. The compilers of the report asked the Americans to evaluate their attitude to various countries on a 100-point scale with the 50-point mark being neutral and any number of points below or above, indicating the measure of a negative or positive attitude. On this scale, the Soviet Union is at the 31-point mark; more negative attitude was expressed only to Iran that epitomizes all that is hostile to the U.S. public mind. One is hardly surprised at the rating given the Soviet Union, considering the administration's great effort to project the image of this country as an "empire of evil."

It seems however that the White House is finding it harder and harder to cash in on anti-Soviet stereotypes. As recent events indicate, greater political advantage is to be gained from the steady public support for Soviet-American arms limitation and reduction agreements. It was under pressure from the anti-nuclear movement and public opinion as a whole that the Reagan Administration finally had to accept the agreement - the first of its kind - with the Soviet Union on eliminating medium- and shorter-range missiles.

Washingtonians greet the Soviet leader. The end to biases!
Photo from Newsweek (U.S.A.)

There can be no doubt of course that Washington is capable of powerful propaganda to mislead public opinion and change whatever sentiments it may find particularly uncomfortable. One example is the SDI, presented to the public as a means of putting an end to the nuclear menace. Many Americans believe and support the SDI.

The world beyond

What are the attitudes of the Americans toward other foreign policy issues? Seventy-five per cent take a negative attitude toward the administration's policy as regards Nicaragua, despite the persisting sentiment to contain communism. The President has made some headway in combating the "Vietnam syndrome" - the opposition to the use of U.S. troops overseas. But the Americans are strongly against a military intervention in Central America. Eighty per cent of those polled believe that military aid to the nations of the region increases the risk of armed U.S. interference.

Many are dissatisfied with the administration's policy in the Middle East. Some 66 per cent of those polled have a low opinion of foreign policy as a whole.

There is yet another interesting trend. Four years ago a mere 15 per cent named foreign policy issues among the most important problems facing the country. The figure now is 26 per cent. In other words the American public is now following Washington's foreign policy moves closely and, as polls indicate, regards them in a more critical way.

It would of course be quite wrong to assume that the Americans have joined the opposition to the administration. The significance of change in public opinion and its implications for the forthcoming presidential elections must not be overestimated. Foreign policy issues are usually of secondary importance compared to domestic issues and above all economic issues. The growth of public interest in foreign policy is due partly to the problems at home. The Americans are concerned about a relative weakening of the economic positions of the country and fear that this may backfire on domestic affairs.

Be that as it may the changes in public opinion are encouraging, largely because they indicate the presence of common sense and an awareness of the realities of the age of nuclear missiles. Changes do not come about easily. They are slowed down by inevitable mental inertia and advocates of a tough foreign policy. Americans remain hypersensitive to the status and prestige of their country on the world scene. One must not discard America's tradition of exclusiveness, or the real role of the United States in the system of international relations. Every society must be accepted the way it is. Those who support constructive development of Soviet-American relations and of the international situation as a whole are encouraged because they feel that the Americans are discarding their weakness syndrome and feeling more certain. We have all paid a dear price for Washington's neurotic moves on the international scene and perhaps we all now stand a better chance of seeing not just one nation alone asserting itself, but the overall growth of world peace and security.

Here is another significant figure. Following the Washington summit 76 per cent of Americans have called on President Reagan to sign a treaty on reducing strategic nuclear weapons during his visit to Moscow. If that treaty comes to pass, the realistic trend in U.S. public opinion will receive a powerful impetus with respect to the most important problem today - the building a nuclear-free world.

The river of life

From our special correspondent
ALBERT PIN

Late last year 20,000 Vietnamese internationalist fighting men returned home from Kampuchea. A dialogue started between Premier Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The article below speaks about today's concerns and hopes of this much-suffering land.

All who are about to enter the Silver Temple of the former royal palace in Pnompenh are asked to take off their shoes. It is a tradition to do so at the door of any pagoda, though the temple as well as the entire palace grounds is now a museum and not used for religious ceremonies. Built of wood in the late 19th century, the Silver Temple was reconstructed rather recently, in the early 1960s,and now its walls are made of stone. The keeper of the museum, Sam Sottia, showed me all the most remarkable treasures of the temple placing, naturally, a particular emphasis on the statue of Buddha made of gold and ornamented with 9,584 diamonds, and the silver floor. I jotted down in my memo that 90 kilograms of gold was spent on the statue and the floor was laid with 5,281 silver plates weighing more than a kilogram each, which added up to 5,809 kilograms of silver, hence the name of the pagoda, the Silver Temple.

The Polpotists, who destroyed everyone and everything, left the temple nearly untouched. They even liked to show it around. And yet, Sam Sottia said, some one tenth of the treasures had disappeared.

It happened that literally a quarter of an hour after leaving the royal palace I was walking on the clay tiles of Pnompenh's former Lyceum Tuol Svay Prey. I was treading on the tiles once stained with the blood of the people who fell victim to Polpotists. Late in 1975 the school was turned into the Tuol Sleng jail, named after the neighbouring residential area. The jail was considered to be the central one, with similar subordinate death camps in Pnompenh and around it. More than 20 thousand prisoners went through Tuol Sleng. The ordinary people - workers, peasants, rank-and-file soldiers - were held here usually for 3-4 months, while intellectuals, career military, civil servants and other high-ranking officials, including ministers in the Pol Pot government, were kept in solitary confinement for as long as 6 months. Then the prisoners were brutally killed. As a rule, at night.

The guide, Laen Somaly, showed the solitary confinement cells with pools of blood ingrained in the floor, with beds to which prisoners were kept chained, the large cells where each prisoner was chained to a long metal rod, and the torture chambers with instruments of torture similar to those used by the medieval inquisitors or the nazi killers. I could not but recall Oswiecim looking at the heaps of various clothes and countless photographs of those who perished - men, women, children.

There are 14 white gravestones in the yard of the Tuol Sleng jail, which cover the remains of those who were found there on January 7, 1979, when the revolutionary armed forces liberated the capital of Kampuchea from the Pol Pot regime.

I can imagine now the horrible picture that came into view in those early evening hours. The magnificence of the Silver Pagoda and the soul-rending rationalism of the Tuol Sleng jail.The light of the subtle art and the darkness of the immeasurable evil. And nearby is the life of the ancient country, a life full of hardships and dramatic conflicts, but vital and aimed towards the future.

3+4

"Kampuchea: 3+4," documentary footage of this title was taken by Khmer cameramen serving in the ranks of the revolutionary patriotic forces soon after the overthrow of the Polpotist clique. The first figure is an indication of the horrible fact that three million people died at the hands of the Polpotists, four million were lucky enough to survive. There is no longer fear in their eyes, but nearly everyone you speak to will tell you that a relative was lost, if not the rest of the family.

Sim Buth Sakun, director of Pnompenh's pharmaceutical factory No.2, has suffered through the deaths of his four brothers who died on an "agricultural commune" near Battambang in the country's northwest section, where the Polpotists began to round up the residents of Pnompenh as soon as they entered the capital on April 17, 1975. The cruel twist of fate is that their coming marked the final end of the military pro-American marshal Lon Nol regime that had controlled the country after the 1970 coup d'etat. But the next morning black-uniformed Polpotists started shooting down those who were reluctant to leave the city. Within the first few days the banishment from Pnompenh resulted in death of 500,000 people. So began "the Polpotist radical revolution" whose one principle read: "All townspeople must become farmers, only those who are capable of growing rice have the right to eat."

Even now you may stumble onto half-ruined, dilapidated houses in the streets of Pnompenh which have not been restored. Not one new building has been built yet. However, the most important thing is that the ghost-city has given way to a busy, bustling, strikingly oriental capital city. More than 700,000 now reside in the capital of Kampuchea. What does their life look like?

...In the central streets of Pnompenh there are many privately-owned small shops, stores, workshops, barbers', eateries. There is no end to all the shops, row upon row of stalls in market places that sell probably everything that grows on Kampuchean land, all that can be made by the hands of local craftsmen and craftswomen - from clothes and footwear to jewelry. There are also all kinds of things brought in from Southeast Asian countries. Some of the commodities are smuggled in, to which the authorities tend to close their eyes, for so far the young republic cannot provide the people with everything they need.

Industry so far plays a modest part in



A group of Vietnamese volunteers before going home from the port of Kompongsam.

Photo by author

the Kampuchean economy. The working class is only 55,000 strong. Most of the country's 70 plants and factories are situated in Pnompenh.

Sim Buth Sakun, whom I mentioned above, is not only the director but also an old-timer of pharmaceutical factory No. 2. When in 1979 he returned home from near Battambang he found the factory, formerly owned by the French and Danish capitals, in complete dislocation.

They collected partially damaged equipment, scattered all over the workshops and the yard, and soon put it back into operation. There are three more pharmaceutical factories in Pnompenh but this one is the largest. What problems does it have? Identical to those at other enterprises. Very obsolete equipment, shortage of skilled personnel, frequent interruptions in power supply. There are problems with raw materials, and here the Soviet Union and Vietnam give a helping hand.

Medicine at the drug stores is not expensive, but it is in short supply. The lack of medical facilities tied directly to the population growth in Pnompenh makes it difficult successfully to combat the epidemics of such serious diseases as malaria, fever, typhus, hepatitis.

Seventy-eight people, mainly women, work now at the factory. Minimum wage is 215 riels, the director is paid 338 riels. Every year, every factory worker who exceeds the quota, receives an additional 2-3 months' wages. Wages in Kampuchea are small but people who work at state enterprises enjoy a number of additional benefits. The workers and members of their families are provided with commodities and products which are in short supply - rice, sugar, soap - at reduced state prices. This, of course, most substantially helps the family budget.

Judge for yourself, the state price for a kilo of rice is 2.5 riels. In the market it costs 5-6 times as much. The buyer has to pay about 60 riels for a kilogram of sugar at the market which costs a state sector worker 7 riels. Townspeople usually buy vegetables, fruit, fish (Kampucheans eat very little meat) at the market, although those who live in the outskirts manage to produce something on their tiny plot of land or in their small pond. They assume in Pnompenh that each person needs at least 70 riels per day. A strong rickshaw cycler is able to make that much, to say nothing of lucky tradespeople and other enterprising businessmen. Expensive Japanese motorcycles and cars in bicycle-filled streets is evidence enough that certainly not everyone here feels the pinch. The personnel of state enterprises and offices, or the members of their families, have to look for extra sources of income in retail trade, crafts, services or in some other sphere...

The life of peasants, comprising 90 per cent of Kampuchea's population, is another story. I will only note here that the year was a very difficult one with hardly any rain. Peasants managed to plant in time rice seedlings on approximately three fourths of the currently farmed fields. This means the country may be short 200,000 tons of rice this year. The Kampuchean leaders take steps in advance to make up for the loss by importing grain.

No matter how difficult the situation still is in this country, any unbiased observer coming to Pnompenh now cannot but come to the conclusion that, after the 1,300 days of Polpotist genocide, the nearly drained river of life is gradually filling, people are regaining hope and belief in tomorrow.

Ninety-nine per cent

The embankment of the Mekong River is probably the most beautiful part of Pnompenh. It always comes alive towards the evening when tropical heat abates. Neatly-dressed children romp around. Street photographers take pictures of all who wish to be photographed against the background of the former royal palace or the stone lions on the parapet. Omnipresent vendors offer you a quick snack or some fruit. Lovers sit in embrace, their bicycle or motorcycle lying nearby. A light breeze rustles the leaves on the palms. The great old river that has seen so much flows peacefully....

At 9 p.m. when the curfew begins a light stillness rather than sleep descends on Pnompenh. The street lamps go out and it seems that only the bright stars and the moon overhead are talking silently with the quiet city.

Many public buildings in the capital are guarded even in the daytime. In some places streets are closed by barriers that discourage fast driving. At the entrances to the city there is a network of checkpoints. With the beginning of curfew hours patrolling is reinforced. One should be on the alert to put a stop to any provocative sallies by the enemies of the republic. From time to time peace and quiet is interrupted by shots and mine explosions.

Son Saramalay, deputy editor-in-chief of the newspaper Kon Toap Padevo published by the Kampuchean defence ministry, points out that the government in general maintains stable control of the situation. It has been a long time since large enemy formations were routed and driven to Thailand. They have never succeeded to set up a permanent stronghold point on the Kampuchean territory. Only small separate detachments were able to infiltrate the country's territory but had to retreat.

Yet the enemy is active within Kampuchea. Having broken down into small groups (comprising 10-15 men), the Polpotists attack villages and then disappear in the jungles. These sallies may not cause such great damage to the economy, but they break the peace in the villages and harass the peasants.

Of late, the Polpotists have marked changed tactics. They formerly used terror and intimidation against the peasants, now they try to strike a bargain with the

villagers. Understandably, rice does not grow in the jungles, and even the dollars with which the Polpotists are so lavishly provided by the enemies of people's Kampuchea cannot buy a thing in the woods. And so greenbacks have come to changed hands - for rice and other food peasants are amply paid with dollars, at even greater prices than currently exist on the market. Also in exchange for rice Polpotists even may offer some as yet scarce commodities, say, transistors....

Buying and selling, and bartering are accompanied by indoctrination. The Polpotists and their partners try to instil into illiterate peasants that it is not against the people that they fight but against "the Vietnamese aggressors." Is it easy for an inhabitant of the backwoods to tell which is a lie, which is the truth? The question is, doubtless, rhetorical. But the characteristic thing is that more and more Polpotists, particularly those who are not guilty of crimes, break away from the past and return to a peaceful life, back to their families. They often do so under the influence of their people, their relatives - wives, sisters - who are brave enough to set out from the village to the jungles to find their husband or brother.

Of course, people run away from Polpotist bands one by one, but sometimes, according to the journalists from the army newspaper, whole groups or units give up to the soldiers of the Kampuchean army. This behaviour has, doubtless, much to do with the factor that the government is vigorously seeking opportunities for national reconciliation.

What do the ordinary people in Pnompenh think of these government efforts? This is what I was told in the Vat Lang Kar pagoda situated at the very centre of the capital, a few steps from Independence Monument. The chairman of the temple council Heng Leang Hor, prior to answering my question, recalled the misfortunes that beset the Buddhist monks under the Pol Pot regime. Buddhism as well as other religions such as Islam and Catholicism was banned. Temples were destroyed or turned into warehouses, barracks, and even into jails and death camps. Priests were killed, put behind bars, made to give up their orange robes and settle on "agricultural communes."

Now religious freedom is fully restored. Once again the doors of the pagodas in towns and villages stay open (80-90 per cent of the population in Kampuchea profess Buddhism), and the priests, as a rule, have become the convinced allies of people's government. In the temple, they remind the congregation, particularly the young, of the country's recent tragic past, the explanatory politics carried out by the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, the Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defence. My interviewee said that gifts to the pagoda - rice, fruit, biscuits, cigarettes - are sent to Kampuchean army soldiers serving in the border areas, given to hospitals or the poor. Money donations are also earmarked to buy food for the army, to expand the pagoda four-grade school which enrolls more than a thousand pupils, to build a meeting room. In other temples they do similar things.

The chairman of the pagoda council is convinced that 99 per cent of the congregation supports the national reconciliation programme. The remaining one per cent, however, are not opponents to the programme, but are mostly illiterate, elderly people who are too old to understand what is going on in their country...

No alternative

Alas, there are quite civilized people who are by no means ignorant but who cannot or will not understand what has been coming about in the land of ancient Angkor. Such people can be found in various countries of the world - in the West, East, North and South. They have their own ideas of the essence of the Kampuchean problem. They reserve the right to ignore the realities of the much-suffering country about whose fate, they profess, they are concerned. There is no lack of those who wish to give advice to the Kampuchean people and draft scenarios of what they should do to resolve their problems. What these sometimes influential people lack is the wish to realize the cherished aspirations of the Kampuchean people, to appreciate the genuine readiness of the leaders of the People's Republic of Kampuchea to achieve a political settlement of the conflict situation in the country and ensure national reconciliation.

It is quite obvious that the horrors of genocide followed by the long years of the undeclared war against their homeland is a tragedy for the Kampuchean people. The war drains them of strength and resources they desperately need to restore their country. A peaceful solution of the conflict is the only way to end the deadlock. This is clearly realized in Pnompenh, and this stand is shared in Hanoi, whose selfless assistance Kampuchea greatly appreciates. Its leaders hope that the need for a political settlement of the Kampuchean problem is also realized by the Khmer opposition factions both in the enemy camp and by émigrés. Only the direct proponents of genocide, Pol Pot and his close associates, are excluded from the national reconciliation process (such is the principled viewpoint on the part of Pnompenh).

As is known, the constructive stand taken by the leaders of the People's Republic of Kampuchea has already found a response in the high-ranking spheres of the opposition. In France in December last year, Kampuchean Premier Hun Sen first met Prince Norodom Sihanouk who ruled the country until 1970. The dialogue, which sparked off great interest worldwide, will be resumed on January 27 of this year.

Just before the meeting between Hun Sen and the prince, the attention of the world public was attracted by another extraordinary event that had a direct bearing on the political solution process in Kampuchea. Withdrawal of the Vietnamese internationalist soldiers from the Kampuchean territory took place for the sixth time. Foreign observers, as well as nearly a hundred journalists from all over the world expressed their wish to attend this event. It is, in itself, a remarkable fact.

In the Kompongsam port, out of which a large group of Vietnamese volunteers would sail home, everybody's attention was attracted by the Vietnamese transport HQ 501 which was obviously a trophy captured from the Americans. All TV and photocameras were aimed at the infantry armoured cars as they crawled into its belly. A Polish journalist standing nearby asked an American colleague who kept clicking the shutter of his camera whether he happened to know the former name of the ship. His answer was a terse No.

I recalled that this American had been much more inquisitive when the journalists had met in Pnompenh the Deputy General Secretary of the National Council of the Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defence, Sisowath Sameth Vong, a member of the royal family and, in her own words, the first princess to serve the proletariat. Even in the most difficult years she never left the homeland, and after victory over Pol Pot, she became a prominent public figure.

"If Norodom Sihanouk comes back to Kampuchea, which is quite likely, will he live in his palace?" the American correspondent tried to find out.

Smiling, the princess recalled that Sihanouk had never liked it in the royal palace and always preferred other residences. But then, she pointed out not without irony, the essence of the problem, naturally, lies elsewhere.

It would be difficult to say for sure what impressions foreign journalists, accustomed to seeing the world in their own light, had when leaving Kampuchea. I believe that even those who had come to Pnompenh with prejudices realized the obvious fact - that people's Kampuchea is looking forward to peace and its only dream is to see the river of its life flowing with high and clear water.

Pnompenh-Moscow

The fate of the "drug czar" or "go ask Colonel North"

On November 15, 1984, the Washington headquarters of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was jubilant: the Spanish police had arrested Jorge Luis Ochoa Vasquez, a Colombian, the "czar" of international drug trafficking, the long-time boss of the Medellin underground cartel in control of 70 per cent of the American cocaine market. However, Spain refused to extradite him to the United States.

LEV YELIN

JORGE OCHOA, A GANGSTER OR A PROSECUTOR?

Ochoa had fled from Colombia to Spain in June 1984 suspected of being involved in the killing of the anti--narcomafia Minister of Justice. In Spain Ochoa bought an estate and ten or so Mercedes limousines (under an assumed name, of course) and opened several accounts in local banks. The former Medellin boss would have lived without a care in the world if his one-time partner, Alder Berriman Seal, an American, hadn't been pinched by the DEA. Seal faced ten years in jail for having smuggled cocaine into Miami. He "sang" almost nonstop, but the stories he poured out made no impression on the DEA's Florida agents. Out on bail, he went to Washington where he met with officers of a special anti-drug task force formed by Vice-President Bush and comprising, besides the DEA men, representatives from the CIA and other U.S. special services. Before long, Seal turned from a paltry "squealer" into "the single most important witness in the DEA's history." He had mentioned Nicaragua in his testimony.

He told the interrogators that Jorge Ochoa had supervised the transportation of cocaine by plane from Colombia to Managua and on to United States. Seal quoted Ochoa as having said that high--ranking Nicaraguan officials considered opening a large cocaine processing laboratory in Managua. According to Seal, Nicaraguans had downed his Vasquez-chartered plane with 1,500 kilos of cocaine on board "by mistake," captured all the cargo and then driven him away. The story did not sound too convincing, but, the DEA believed it and even allowed Seal to repeat his "Odyssey" entirely on his own in the hope of proving Managua's complicity in drug trafficking.

CIA-men fastened a cinecamera to the belly of a small transport plane Seal had purchased, and sent him off.

The flight took place in June 1984. Later Seal testified that on an airfield near Managua Sandinista soldiers in mufti had loaded cocaine into his plane under the guidance of an assistant to Tomas Borge, Nicaragua's Minister of the Interior himself. The criminal's words had to be taken on trust for want of any factual evidence: the cloudy black-and-white film he produced showed only blurred figures of unidentifiable individuals carrying sacks. What the sacks contained - cocaine, flour, or sand - and where the film had been taken was anybody's guess. Although the White House lost no time in "leaking" the information of the extreme-right Washington Times, the DEA categorically denied possessing any evidence that would incriminate Nicaraguan officials in cocaine trade.

By that time even the most gullible in the DEA realized, who had "bought" Seal. The "czar" and his men were merely trump cards in an anti-Nicaraguan game. The "czar" was needed merely to lend substance to the aspersions Seal cast upon Managua.

An anonymous informer put Interpol on Jorge Vasquez's trail. On October 17, 1984, the U.S. Embassy in Madrid officially demanded that Ochoa be extradited for trial in America.

The "czar" was arrested a month later. Fernando Martinez Cos-Gayon of the Madrid police deparment's special anti--drug division, interrogated Vasquez for four days in the basement of Puerta de Santa Maria high-security prison. All the while Cos-Gayon pressured Vasquez continuously to have him testify to the Nicaraguan government being involved in international drug trafficking.

The Spanish policeman promised presumably on behalf of his American colleagues - to reciprocate by making ou extradition papers in such a way as to secure his release.

The interrogations, aimed at putting words into the prisoner's mouth rathe than extracting information from him, were attended by Florentino Gomez Mesa Cos-Gayon's chief, and James Kible a Madrid-based DEA agent.

Jorge Ochoa disappointed the three of them. The "czar" reasoned that if he said what they wanted him to say, he would soon be silenced for ever lest he should go back on his words when out of the basement. So Ochoa reiterated that he knew nothing about Managua's implication, and had no dealings with the Sandinistas. He managed to make the Puerta de Santa Maria interrogation public knowledge through lawyers. After a dozen hearings in which 28 judges took part, the Spanish authorities refused to extradite the gangster to the United States on the grounds that Washington wanted Vasquez not for his crimes (in which case extradition is stipulated by law) but out of political considerations (for use in an anti-Nicaraguan campaign). Ochoa was extradited to Colombia instead.

Six weeks later the "czar of Medellin" walked out of prison and disappeared without a trace.

The subsequent developments proved that Ochoa had played his cards right in the Spanish jail. In February 1986 his disloyal companion Alder Seal was killed in Louisiana by gunmen whose identity was never established. Seal was riddled with bullets in an expressly gangster movie style.

WHAT HAPPENED IN SPAIN OWING TO OCHOA'S STUBBORNNESS CAME AS A SURPRISE TO THE ORGANIZERS OF THE WHOLE OPERATION WHO WERE CERTAIN OF SUCCESS AND HAD ALL THEIR PAWNS IN POSITION.

Alder Seal. He was expected to give anti-Nicaraguan evidence for the reasons which never surfaced in court: prior to his arrest Seal **had** actually dealt in cocaine, only his connections were the contras rather than the Sandinistas.

Seal took part in supplying the contras with arms from "private" sources after official aid to them had been banned by



on a C-123 plane, which he claims to have purchased shortly before. In October 1986 that very plane was shot down as it was carrying a load of arms and ammunition over Nicaragua. The pilot, Eugene Hasenfus, survived. His confession to having been sent by the CIA contributed to the body of evidence which subsequently exploded into the Iran-contra scandal.

North's men and Seal had probably taken turns using the plane.

Cos-Gayon. Reporters of the U.S. magazine The Nation wondered why Ochoa had been questioned by a low-ranking policeman. But it turned out that Madrid had been asked to put him on the job by the U.S. Department of Justice!



One of the airfields where North's team delivered weapons to the contras. How many planes flew back to the U. S. with loads of cocaine on board!

Congress. Cocaine trade augmented the incomes considerably. In 1985 a private airline pilot disclosed the mechanism for the "jobs" pulled off by operators like Seal: CIA-hired planes flew arms from Florida to the air base of Ilopango, El Salvador, and on their way back fetched loads of cocaine from Colombia or Costa Rica. They did not confine themselves to these routes, of course.

Four pilots who engaged in this business and were later arrested for cocaine trafficking told a Wall Street Journal reporter that they knew Alder Seal well, as a member of Lt. Col. Oliver North's team! Here is an interesting, but hardly chance, coincidence: Seal had flown to Managua

Cos-Gayon had received his training in the U.S. and had been in contact with James Kible, a Madrid-based DEA agent, ever since. The latter's interests are by no means confined to drug control.

Kible also took part in North's secrete operations. In October 1986 Kible and a colleague of his were detained in the Madrid airport as they tried to leave for Switzerland. Kible's attaché case proved to contain five million dollars in cash. They stayed in police custody for 28 hours until Gomez Mesa, Cos-Gayon's chief, intervened (the minutes of their interrogations disappeared later from the archives). Be that as it may, Kible confessed to Spanish policemen that funds intended for America's secret operations had been repeatedly smuggled through Spain.

Drawing upon information obtained from government sources, the newspaper El Pais reported that the five million in the attaché case were to have been put into a secret Swiss bank account which North controlled.

It follows from the records of the Senate committee which investigated the circumstances of the Iran-contra scandal that Edwin Meese, the U.S. Attorney General, had allowed North to enlist the services of certain DEA men in carrying out his operation. The thing is that the DEA is distinct from the CIA in that it is not accountable to Congress for its secret operations. Langley financed Kible and other DEA officers involved in North's underhand deals - a fact even their immediate superiors had no knowledge of.

Jorge Ochoa. The Colombian "drug czar" was expected to be more tractable. He had never been a Sandinista sympathizer. Trying to curry favour with the DEA and CIA agents who operated in the region, he had previously provided the contras with money and arms, through Ramon Milian-Rodriguez, a member of the Medellin cartel. In June 1987, Milian Rodriquez, serving his sentence of 35 years in an American jail, testified that he had handed the money over to a certain Felix Rodriguez on several occasions.

The Medellin cartel would not have entrusted millions of dollars(and its donations to the contras ran into millions!) to a stranger. Rodriquez was a CIA agent better known under the name of Max Gomez - and a key figure in the Iran-contra scandal as a linkman between North's team and the staff of Vice-President Bush. (Incidentally, it was to the latter that Alder Seal had applied for protection against the slow-witted agents of DEA's Florida branch.)

"If you want to get to the bottom of this affair," Ochoa's attorney advised, "go ask Colonel North."

TO SUM UP, ALMOST ALL THOSE WHO LOOKED FOR THE "NICARAGUAN CONNECTION" WERE INVOLVED WITH OLIVER NORTH IN SOME WAY OR



OTHER. WAS THAT AN INDICATION THAT NORTH'S TEAM HAD DEVISED A PLAN FOR "IMPLICATING" MANAGUA IN DRUG TRAFFICKING?

In any case, this conclusion is prompted by the logic of the team's action. Seal was recruited in March 1984 - shortly after Managua had announced its intention to lodge a complaint against the U.S. with the International Court. The U.S. Embassy in Spain demanded Ochoa's extradition within days of the Congress adopting the amendment banning all aid to the contras.

In March 1986 President Reagan had an American TV network show the "documentary" Seal had allegedly taken in Nicaragua. Having accused the Nicaraguan leadership of drug trafficking, he exlaimed emotionally: "There seems to be no crime to which the Sandinistas will not stoop!" Before long, the contras have received 100 million dollars from the United States.

The chronology of the "Ochoa affair" fits in with that of North's operations.It was precisely in March 1984 that North started to enlist U.S. military and public figures in rendering aid to the contras through private channels. Therefore, the anti-Nicaraguan "exposés" suited him fine.

WHILE THE "OCHOA AFFAIR" WAS IN PROGRESS COCAINE TRADE WAS CARRIED ON PRACTICALLY UNHINDERED.

In 1985, several Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries were caught unloading cocaine from a Colombian plane which had landed near San Francisco. An investigation began, but news of how it proceeded was suddenly blacked out, and some reporters of the San Francisco Examiner started an inquiry of their own. What they found out sounded incredible: Julio Zavala, one of the detainees, showed the authorities some letters from the contra chiefs saying that the receipts of drug sales were to cover the expenses involved in fighting the government of Nicaragua, to buy weapons and ammunition. In the end, the U.S. government gave Zavala a check for 36,000 dollars. Was that a compensation for the cocaine it had confiscated?

Julio Zavala's attorney told a closed session of the court that "agents of the U.S. government had either sanctioned use of cocaine trafficking to raise funds for contra activity, or had led the defendant into believing it was sanctioned."

Those "believing it was sanctioned" included Dan Rather, a CBS correspondent who made public the following story last spring.

A privately-owned DC-6 plane landed in the Miami International Airport on March 21. When customs officials tried to examine it, the pilots demanded that a "Mr Palmer" be called in first, and gave them his phone number. Mr Palmer arrived shortly and said that the plane did belong to his company but had been hired out to the U.S. State Department. He warned the customs men that if they tried to inspect the plane they would be in big trouble. A check of the tough visitor's identity revealed that his name was indeed Michael Palmer. He had served time in a Colombian jail for drug transportation, then resumed his line of business and was wanted by the police again. The Miami customs officials' excitement over the "big catch" was cooled down by a telephone call from the CIA about the DC-6 flight and about "Mr Palmer." "This is our flight," a voice at the other end of the line said curtly.

This time, Rather reported, no drugs were found on board the DC-6. Were there really none? Or could they have been deliberately overlooked after that call from Langley?

The Senate commission acquired some documents proving beyond doubt that the CIA had spent drug money on clandestine arms supplies to the contras. The documents had been captured on March 28 on board a DC-4 transport plane belonging to a Hondu-Carib Cargo Inc. The DC-4 was purchased with drug money. Arrested in April 1985, cocaine traffickers testified that the plane was one of the main cocaine "shuttles" flying between Honduras and the U.S.

There is no rush to publish the captured documents.

Besides the documents, there was another source of information concerning the contras and their patrons' involvement in cocaine trade. Hugo Spadafora, a former Panamanian official, used to forward batches of cocaine to the U.S. throughout 1984. The morning after he had reported this fact to the DEA's Costa Rican branch, he was found dead, neatly packed in a mailbag, his head chopped off.

JUDGING FROM EVERYTHING, OLIVER NORTH'S TEAM, WHICH INCLUDED CIA AND DEA AGENTS, KNEW ABOUT THE COCAINE TRAFFICKING BYWAYS AND EVEN PROTECTED THE CONTRAS WHO ENGAGED IN IT. THIS IS REAFFIRMED BY THE RECORDS OF THOSE IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED IN THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL.

In her recent book on the history of the Reagan administration's secret war in Nicaragua, illicit arms deliveries and the contras' connection with drug smuggling, an American newswoman writes that the contra drug traffickers operated from a Costa Rican ranch owned by John Hull, an ex-CIA man, who received at least 10,000 dollars a month from the National Security Council.

Two former CIA agents - Thomas Clines and Theodore Shackley - took part in North's financial operations. Besides, Clines was directly in charge of hiring pilots for delivering supplies to the contras. Here are just a few words about these two men's past.

Back in the early sixties, Clines and Shackley jointly worked in Miami receiving Cuban immigrants and recruiting them for anti-Castro action. At that time, big cocaine traffickers, connected with Amedrican mafia, fled from Cuba; the CIA enlisted the cooperation of both. For instance, Langley hired gangsters Sam Giancana and John Roselli connected with Cuban drug traffickers under Batista to assassinate Fidel Castro. Langley realized then that drugs provided an excellent opportunity for building up funds to finance clandestine operations abroad independent of Congress.

In the mid-sixties, Clines and Shackley were in Vietnam and Laos directing the "armies" of local mercenaries, issuing instructions to the CIA agents and to the CIA-connected airlines, such as Air America. The mercenaries headed by Vang Pao grew opium poppies, while the Air America planes and helicopters dropped off arms and picked up loads of opium. The Nugan Hand bank was established in Australia to "launder" the opium money, with mostly CIA men including Director William Colby himself among its consultants. Michael Hand, the bank's virtual manager, used to serve in American military intelligence in Laos and therefore knew Clines and Shackley well. In Australia, the latter became Hand's undercover partners (he did business with 26 big heroin dealers in all). Clines is known to have deposited millions of dollars in the bank (which was way out of proportion to his salary).

In 1984, Clines and Shackley found themselves on North's team as the men responsible for air traffic; more than a half of the flights they arranged brought cocaine to America.

A coincidence?

"The efforts to contain communism and combat narcotics are often at 'cross purposes,'" said Richard Gregorie, Assistant U.S. Attorney General. "Maybe there is a part of the administration that is so worried about the godless communist conspiracy that they've lost sight of the true objectives of stopping the flow of drugs to the United States." Well, in this case it would be only logical to go further - i.e., to encourage those who are prepared to let drugs into the America homes for the sake of suppressing "godless communism"...

Photo from world press

FROM THE BLACK SEA TO THE ALPS

"It's in my present and in my descendants' future"

VLADIMIR GERASIMOV

Near the Visegrad fortress the serpentine roads converge to form a large observation site. The view is picturesque - a wooded mountain range is drastically cut by the Danube. The brimming energetic river flows swiftly below.

"A dam with turbines will span the banks," Miklos Szanto, director-general of the waterworks investment agency, told me. "Farther away a temporary river bed has been laid. A dry pit, almost under our feet, is to be protected by a circular dike." He went on. "We'll destroy it later. But the locks on the other bank, near the line of lombardy poplars, will be preserved."

Miklos Szanto pointed to one of the installations of the new integrated waterworks. Other journalists and I had come to the bend of the Danube at Visegrad, as the district is called, in the early morning. A golden yellow and blue carpet spread before our eyes, and the din of cars below was foreign to this quiet suburban area. An echo of sharp public debate also seemed to be in the air. Is it necessary to build all these dikes and sluices on the Danube and thereby tamper with nature? the public has asked.

The Hungarian-Czechoslovak design of the hydrotechnical complex had been prepared in the mid-1970s. It provides for the construction of two hydroelectric power stations, two hydro-cascades, two water reservoirs, canals and locks. Today it could be described as a careful project. Indeed, all the problems involved have been studied scrupulously. Won't the complex affect the underground reservoirs supplying Budapest with water? One of them is situated only 40 kilometres away from the capital. Won't it affect the climate, the famous thermal springs and the recreation zone?

One hydropower station is to be erected at Gabcikovo, on the Slovak bank of the Danube, and the other at Nagymaros, opposite Visegrad, in Hungary. Their total capacity is 880 megawatts. Can the area manage without these stations in the future? How can Hungary be more effectively protected against the common floods? And shipping? The 212 km section of the Danube between Bratislava and Budapest is the last section not regulated by waterworks.

What is the alternative to the construction of dikes and cascades?. All details of the project have been studied and re-examined, and alternative schemes have been proposed. Thorough ecological forecasts have been drawn up. Czechoslovakia's Council for Environment Protection has demanded that an additional study be made of all the areas of doubt. Essay competitions were held on the subject "The aesthetic adaptation of an electric power station to the environment."

"We have carried out extensively new research and mathematical modelling," said Academician Bruno Straub, who was also at the observation site that morning. "A great deal of research has been undertaken for the first time. For instance, we have studied what influence a new water balance may have on agricultural productivity. A number of studies have been conducted jointly with Slovak scientists. A chain of observation posts is being organized in the area of waterworks. Representatives of the local population and various public groups have been informed of the work done and its results."

The preservation of nature was seen as a matter of paramount importance. Finally, in 1986, the chairman of the government's water conservation authority declared that the design was well grounded and provided for a number of commendable environment protection measures.

Besides yielding a gain in energy (the

For previous instalments see Nos. 33, 36, 39, 43, 47, 49, 51 of last year.

The river has given life to the Hungarian capital

Nagymaros hydropower station will save Hungary 700,000 tons of oil products a year), the complex ensures protection against floods which occasionally cause great damage to the country.

More cargoes can be transported by water in a shorter time because the navigation period will be increased by 40 per cent and the freight-carrying capacity of the fleet, by 20 per cent thanks to the higher water level in the Danube. Energy consumption in shipping will be reduced by half owing to a lessening of current pressure.

A number of canals will link the dead arms of the Danube and intake structures will bring fresh water to them. As a result, new recreation areas can be established. The plan also envisages the building of roads, hotels and camp grounds on the Danube banks.

A pleasure boat, overcoming vortexes and raising foamy waves (the Danube is rough at Visegrad and Nagymaros) took us to one more installation - a weir at Dunakiliti. Miklos Szanto explained that the Austrian firm Donaukraftwerke AG (its credit - 5.7 billion shillings) was taking part in the building of the Hungarian part of the complex. It was agreed to cut the time of construction from five to three years, with the first unit to start generating electricity by 1992.

Hungary is going to repay the credit by the annual delivery of 1.2 billion kilowatt-hours to Austria from 1996 to 2015. At Dunakiliti, where our boat anchored, the plan was one month ahead of schedule. Five million cubic metres of earth was excavated last year. The builders were welding the mesh reinforcements and pouring them into the finished sections of the bank.

In 1988 construction time has to be reduced by five months. Hungary is expected to build the weir facilities, motor-road bridges, transformers and switch gears.

The complex, one of the largest projects on the Danube at the end of the century, will cost Hungary 54 billion forints between 1986 and 1990. Several billions will have to be spent for town and village improvement in adjoining areas and for environment protection. But this additional investment is necessary for the benefit of the Danube, a question also discussed by the Danube Commission.

Flags of 30 nations

The Convention on the Shipping Regime on the Danube, which took place in Belgrade, ended on August 18, 1948. Thus soon the Danube Commission will observe its 40th anniversary. True, a similar body existed before the war. It formed "a state within a state" on the Danube, with its police, custom houses and tariffs, and comprised representatives of countries quite remote from the Danube - the United States, Britain and France. A curious thing is that a prewar body existed in Rome even until 1960 and was parallel to the functioning Danube Commission in Budapest.

Having proclaimed during the founding convention that shipping on the Danube is equally free and open to the citizens, merchant ships and business of all states, the Danube nations - the real hosts of the river - seek at their annual sessions and meetings of experts to accelerate the working rhythm of the great European waterway.

The shipping regime established by the Danube Commission makes no exceptions for any particular country, whether a Danube nation or not. Ships flying the flags of 30 nations sailed on the river in 1987. At the same time the Danube Commission has made it binding that the host nations keep their sections of the river navigable and constantly improve freight conditions. For this reason the building of the hydrotechnical complex that will eliminate the "whirlpools" between Bratislava and Budapest has been welcomed by all partners.

A meeting of the Danube Commission experts, held as usual at the end of the year, summed up the results of 1987 and took into consideration various technical questions.

"We have examined possible use of the European regulations concerning the transportation of dangerous cargoes on the Danube," said Djordje Lalosevic, head of the Danube Commission secretariat and a Yugoslav representative on the Commission, "We are also studying ecological protection and anti-pollution recommendations. It is strictly forbidden to dump oil products and other waste from ships. The commission studied proposals by competent engineers for improving the radar instruments installed at all 67 Danube observation posts, buoys and floating beacons. We see to it that nautical charts and other navigation documents are published. At present we intend to put out a number of new and revised reference books."

Djordje Lalosevic and his deputy, Eduard Veresotsky of the Soviet Union, acquainted me with the agenda of the meeting. It seems to reflect the extensive work carried out by the commission. The host nations of the river constantly deal with increasing the security of navigation and unifying the navigation rules. Unlike roadways, the traffic signs on the rivers are determined not by international standard but by each country. Uniform signs should be introduced as quickly as possible. This is necessary because with the aid of canals, the Rhine and the Main (and, in perspective, the Oder and the Elbe) will soon be linked with the Danube. The intensity of freight traffic will sharply increase.



Morning on the busy Danube.

River-sea system

In 1978 the Danube shipping companies of Bulgaria, Hungary, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia set up an international shipping enterprise in Budapest called Interlighter, a technological river-sea system. Today this enterprise has at its disposal 200 flat-bottomed barges (lighters), 1,600 containers, and two large ocean-going cargo lighters.

"Where are your barges at the moment?"

"Three barges have just arrived in Ho Chi Minh, bringing shoe uppers from Czechoslovakia, three are being loaded there with rubber for Bulgaria, and three

re still sailing along the Mekong," nterlighter director-general Vladimir Usnakov replied after contacting the control oom.

"Soy-beans have been loaded on barge in a Kampuchean river port. What lse? We have received a request from Austria for the delivery of sheet steel to Bombay. Several barges are going to eave Bulgaria with transformers for Pa-

o catch a fish...
Photo from Budapest Album (Hungary)

istan. In Izmail, barges are being loaded with Soviet newsprint for India.

"As you see, cargoes of various kinds are loaded on barges which, going down stream, are placed on ocean lighters. Though the situation in river and sea shipping is comlicated, economically the esults are quite good."

Vladimir Ushakov showed me the chedule of iighter routes. It takes 30 days o sail from the Danube to India or Pakistan and 46 days to the Mekong. Thanks to punctual traffic the delivery of goods under co-production agreements could be organized. For instance, Hungary and Czechoslovakia send raw materials to Vietnam and receive finished and semi-finished light industry products.

It has become advantageous to ship chemical components from Yugoslavia to Bombay and Karachi. Lighters also sail to the Dnieper, bringing rubber straight from Vietnam to Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk and Bobruisk and taking fertilizers back.

The work of Interlighter also impels member companies to make a critical evaluation of their own "shipping" affairs.

"Things are not so good as we would like them to be," comlained Istvan Csakvari, the commercial director of the Hungarian joint-stock shipping company MAHART. "By transporting Hungarian-made goods (10 to 15 per cent of the country's exports are delivered to customers by the Danube seaway) we save hard currency, and by carrying out foreign orders, we earn it. However, we must be very flexible, persistent and have enough push to ensure full ship loads in the present conditions of tough competition. We have expanded our service by organizing delivery of goods from door to door "mixed shipment services."

MAHART has 20 ocean-going ships with a total tonnage of 100,000, 160 barges with a total freight-carrying capacity of 230,000 tons, 28 passenger ships on the Danube and 26 on Lake Balaton. Several years ago the management of this company increased its profitability by reorganizing its setup and reducing the administrative personnel by 25 per cent.

New modernization has been started. Four sea-going ships, brought into commission over 15 years ago, will be sold and new ones leased. The company is buying three cargo ships, adapted for container shipment, in China. Csepel, the largest port on the Hungarian section of the Danube, is to be further modernized. The grain storage houses, refrigerators, outdoor and indoor warehouses need capital investment and repair work. In short, the river transport workers have their hands full.

In the past few years river transportation has taken over a considerable part of the Hungarian and Soviet export and import of goods which were formerly carried by railways. I was told at the head office of the Soviet-Danube Shipping Company in Budapest that the volume of foreign-trade goods carried on waterways rose by 35 per cent last year.

* * *

It is best of all to look at Budapest from onboard a ship or from a bridge. One can see the panoramic view of the hills of Buda, the ancient Fisher Bastion and imposing statues of the Freedom monument, the numerous "deposits" of small houses, and Pest on the flat land,the fancilly ornamented building of parliament and the modern high-rise hotels shining in the sun - all visible as if looking through a wide-angle lense. The city seems to turn its face on the Danube, greeting it joyfully and showing the river all the secrets of its beauty.

I have visited all the Danube countries. In some of their cities one can see from the river dreary fences, factory yards and warehouses. That is why Buda and Pest are worthy of praise for their respect towards the great Danube. This respect - I would even say worship - before the blue spanse of energetic waters is particularly visible today.

Near the parliament rises the bronze sculpture of a man gazing at the Danube waters. The sculptor called it "At the Danube." It is a monument to the poet Atilla Jozsef, who after taking off his hat and coat and unbuttoning the collar of his shirt, turned to face the fresh wind from the river.

"The Danube was wise; it seemed to flow from my heart, and the waves flexed like muscles, like the hands of a working man.... It is in my present and my descendant's future."

These lines from the poem "At the Danube" end with the wish that "all of us would, at last, join our hands in common deeds."

Budapest

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Winds of change

A New Times correspondent's questions are answered by NINA SMIRNOVA, D.Sc. (Hist.)

New Times: Much is being written about Albania, especially abroad. What, in your opinion, is characteristic of these publications?

Nina Sminova: To put it in a nutshell, interest in the new trends of the republic's domestic and foreign policy. This is quite logical because there are major changes under way in Albania - a search for means to increase the effectiveness of the economy in order to raise the population's standard of living and for methods designed to improve the functioning of state and Party machinery.

The People's Socialist Republic of Albania has been increasing its ties with the rest of the world. At present Albania maintains relations with more than 100 states and takes part in a number of international organizations. Although in the past Albania refrained from developing multilateral political contacts within the Balkan region framework, it intends to participate in a meeting of Balkan foreign ministers to be held in Belgrade in February 1988. The number of foreign journalists, various delegations and tourists coming to the country has risen which is making it possible to become better acquainted with present-day Albania.

Of course, some of the eyewitness accounts are capable of producing only surprise. For instance, in November 1987 an Associated Press correspondent depicted in his dispatch such a gloomy picture of Albanian life that it could only be ascribed, perhaps, to the days of King Zogu. According to this correspondent, Albania allegedly has only two highways, and the land is tilled manually. Of course, with our own eyes, that is, as reported by our journalists, we could have seen the complete picture of Albanian reality. However, we have to dispense with second-hand information, which cannot claim to always be objective.

N.T.: It is known that many Western writers try to make their readers believe that Albania will never normalize relations with the Soviet Union. What, in your opinion, lies behind such predictions?

N.S.: First of all, the present-day state of Soviet-Albanian relations, or more exactly, the lack of relations, is to the liking of many Western politicians. Which is understandable, for such public figures use every opportunity to prevent socialist countries from being united. In addition, the official viewpoint of the Albanian leadership, professed virtually in every major Albanian document of the past few years, rejects the prospect of reestablishing ties between our two countries.

How irreparable is this break in reality? It is difficult to tell. However, the F.R.G., as a current example, seemed to have consolidated its place in the list of countries with which Albania "would never, never establish relations." Preserved in the people's memories are the hard days of the nazi invasion, the F.R.G. government's refusal to pay the reparation debts, outbreaks of revanchism, the virus of neonazism in the F.R.G. Here is a collection of allegedly insurmountable obstacles along the road towards rapprochement. Nonetheless on October 2, 1987 we are suddenly reading a report of establishing diplomatic relations between the two states, and 20 days later, as reported in an official communiqué, Ramiz Alia, First Secretary of the CC of the Albanian Party of Labour, has a "friendly discussion" with the West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. During the talk Ramiz Alia expresses hope of "rapprochement and friendship between our two countries and peoples."

N.T.: Do you consider this step unexpected?

N.S. Not at all. It is in keeping with the intention of the Albanian leadership to expand international ties. This step is quite logical in the context of the criteria held by Albania. What are these criteria? As was mentioned in the communiqué, Albania "stands for creating a genuine atmosphere of confidence and friendship between peoples and for establishing normal mutually beneficial relations with all states that respect the principles regulating relations between sovereign states." You will agree that this coincides with the position held by our country.

In speaking about relations between the new Albania, which was born in the years of the heroic national liberation struggle against the nazi invaders, and the Soviet Union, I would like to remind you that both during the war and in the initial 15 postwar years they were marked by close cooperation. At the turn of the 1960s ideological differences arose which affected interstate relations and led to an actual break between our two countries.

N.T.: You were in Albania in 1961 and had the chance to immediately sense the atmosphere during that time.

N.S.: Yes. While in Tirana from April to May in 1961, I was fully exposed to the dramatic tension of the situation: I had to hear out bitter words both from top-level ideological functionaries of the Albanian Party of Labour and from my former classmates. Many representatives of the Albanian intelligentsia, including the

A hotel in the city of Elbasan

current First Secretary of the APL, Ramiz Alia, were educated in the U.S.S.R.

In musing over that period, I recall a thought from V.I. Lenin's work on the nationalities question. Noting the strength and tenacity of national egoism, prejudices and the national narrow-mindedness of economically backward countries that had torn themselves away from the capitalist system, Lenin recognized that "it is the duty of the class-conscious communist proletariat of all countries to regard with particular caution and attention the survivals of national sentiments in the countries and among nationalities which have been oppressed the longest; it is equally necessary to make certain concessions with a view to more rapidly overcoming this distrust and these prejudices."

I believe that then, in the early 1960s, we sustained damage for lack of tolerance and a shortage of quiet, sober analysis of the situation. This was the result of a display of the voluntarism and subjectivism which we condemned. Actions by individual people damaged the reputation of our country which had enjoyed high prestige with all Albanians ever since the initial years of Soviet power. They held V.I. Lenin to be founder of the Albanian state if only because he annulled tsarist Russia's infamous secret treaties, one of which liquidated the independence of Albania.

N.T.: So in December 1961 an actual break of diplomatic relations occurred between our countries. How did the events develop further?

N.S.: This was followed by an avalanche of extraneous developments that have screened from our view the real problems existing in our relations, and now few can understand the gist of what has happened. In addition, there is great pressure from the stereotypes that have formed in the Soviet-Albanian relations over the past 25 years, when relations between our two countries proved to be broken up. It is difficult to relinquish old attitudes, as we know from our own experience of trying to sort out the complex events and processes that took place in our country. One of the principal lessons of the 27th CPSU Congress is the lesson of truth. As Mikhail Gorbachev said, "a conscientious analysis of the past clears the way to the future."

N.T.: Do you think prejudices should be abandoned in assessing the individual complex moments of Soviet-Albanian relations?

N.S.: Yes. What is needed is a psychological perestroika. At times you wonder whether the Albanian statesmen will never have enough insight to overcome personal resentment for the sake of restoring the links between the ordinary people and scientists of our two countries. Most people who are guilty of what happened a quarter of a century ago are dead. But even now, in our day, Albanian propaganda continues to speak of contemporary "Khrushchevians," about a "Khrushchevian line" allegedly pursued in domestic and foreign policy of our country. With great interest the whole world is following the processes and changes taking place in the U.S.S.R. But for some reason those in Tirana refuse to see the new realities.

It happened that the ruling parties in both Albania and the U.S.S.R. acquired new leaders almost simultaneously. A truly revolutionary process of renovation has begun in this country. New trends have taken shape in Albania's politics. The Soviet Union is objectively and benevolently evaluating the process of improving the political and economic life in socialist

A national trade - the export of traditional Albanian items.

Albania, which is striving towards the goal common of all socialist countries. But Albania continues to use the stereotypes of the mid-1960s. They speak of "Soviet social imperialism," of "capitalist regeneration" and similar nonsense.

N.T.: You have mentioned the changes which have recently taken place in the domestic life of Albania. Would you please elaborate?

N.S.: As the Albanian leaders themselves admit, the country has run into complicated problems which demand new solutions. In general, the word "new" can be heard in Albania quite frequently now. The current five-year plan is rather intense - it provides for high social indices in various spheres of social life. The measures taken by the government are designed to promote the successful realization of these plans. The Albanian press is comprehensively and enthusiastically discussing the problem of improving the economic mechanism. Emphasis is put on the need to give enterprises more freedom in fulfilling the plan.

N.T.: Is there talk of improving the principles of cost-accounting and of its rational combination with centralized economic management?

N.S.: Albanian economists note that there is no need to concentrate the entire income of an enterprise within the state budget - it should be more widely used to expand local production. The problem of increasing the enterprise's independence is closely associated with the need to limit the functions of the centralized planning of production. Last year, the newspaper Bashkimi criticized the point of view according to which the more indices in the ministerial plan, the better. Such viewpoints lead to situations where the plan for producing items such as shoelaces or lentil is issued from above. Excessive centralization of indices, the newspaper holds, is a manifestation of bureaucracy, it suppresses the initiative of the masses. By the way, much attention is devoted to the struggle against bureaucracy; the need is emphasized to stop making fetishes of certain decrees and norms and of the propensity towards receiving ready-made solutions from above.

N.T.: In connection with this, one should also mention the decisions adopted in Albania to raise the role of material incentives.

N.S.: In 1987 the Albanian Council of Ministers adopted important resolutions "On Stimulating the Growth of Production with the Help of Wages," "On More Effective Use of Additional Material Incentives and Special Funds," "On Criteria for Appraising the Financial and Economic Activities of Socialist Enterprises." The aim of these decisions is to use economic means to stimulate the activities of the working people, especially those in sectors which are of most significance to the economy. By the same token, one achieves a more flexible combination of the interests of society, of the collective and of the individual worker. The same trends manifest themselves in agriculture.

N.T.: The changes in the economic mechanism bring about new demands with regard to personnel. What is the approach to this problem?

N.S.: The process of the renewal and rejuvenation of personnel is viewed as a most important direction in the politics of the Albanian Party of Labour. An employee, whatever his post is in the state apparatus, is liable to lose his position if he sticks to old canons, cultivating routine and bureaucracy. The APL has put forward a requirement: to replace the cadres every 8 or 10 years.

A process of rejuvenation is also under way in the organs of power. Nearly 32 per cent of the People's Assembly has been renewed following the recent elections and now about half the deputies are less than 40 years old.

N.T.: Are there any other directions in the activities of the APL that can be considered as priority-oriented at the current stage?

N.S.: The APL devotes much attention to creating a businesslike atmosphere in discussing emerging problems. The newspaper Zeri i Popullit wrote recently

that discussion, not its absence, represents the crucial factor which puts the intellectual energy of people into motion, that free discussion is conducive to constructive criticism. The editorial of the APL CC organ stressed that "criticism of shortcomings in the economy can and must be conducted both from above and below... so that today's shortcomings will not be repeated." It is stated that criticism should be concrete. In speaking of the role played by criticism, Ramiz Alia has emphasized that "criticism of shortcomings does no harm. On the contrary, it strengthens the economy, society and government. It makes the latter more democratic, preventing bureaucratic regeneration."

In February 1987, Zeri i Popullit called for developing "progressive new thinking and new revolutionary ideas" as opposed to " bureaucratic manifestations."

N.T.: The changes in Albania's domestic life seem to testify that the country's leadership is striving to bring the economic mechanism into conformity with the new requirements, to tap more fully the reserves of the socialist system. In connection with this, can one speak of the similarity between the processes taking place in Albania and what is going on in the U.S.S.R.?

N.S.: I would speak not of similarity of the processes, but of some common approaches. Thus, Edith Lhomel, a French researcher of Albania's economy, mentions that there are new elements in the economic policy of the Albanian leadership, namely, a turn to the needs of the working people, and with surprise exclaims: "The human factor in Albania!" But paradox lies in the fact that, even in cases when the approaches are similar, this is categorically denied in Albania. Moreover, everything that is taking place in this country is criticized.

N.T.: Doesn't it seem to you that the new trends in Albanian politics are creating objective opportunities for expanding Albania's cooperation with the socialist countries?

N.S.: Exactly. With all fluctuations and shifts in Albania's foreign trade ties, postwar conditions objectively facilitate the preservation and development of Albania's relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, which account for more than 60 per cent of the country's foreign trade. A new phenomenon is Albania's participation in international fairs held in socialist countries.

N.T.: In connection with this (and here we again return to the beginning of our talk), what are, in your opinion, the prospects for adjusting the Soviet-Albanian relations?

N.S.: The 27th CPSU Congress stated that "above all we endeavour to see what unites the socialist world." The main thing now is not concentrating on past mistakes and past contradictions. Although, of course, it does not mean that one ought to forget all that happened. This is impossible. Simply, it is high time to calmly and objectively analyze what has occurred. It is necessary to make use of one of the advantages of socialism:its ability to find mutually acceptable solutions even to most complicated problems. I am convinced that the positive factors which are bringing our peoples closer together are more numerous than the negative ones. The negative factors are associated with manifestations of voluntarism and subjectivism, with individual personages. A principled assessment of this was given by the CPSU. Putting aside everything artificial, we must rely on the deep roots of friendship which, I know, have been preserved in our people and, I believe, in the Albanian people.

Interviewed by
GENNADY SYSOYEV

LITERATURE AND HISTORY

ONWARD... ONWARD!

Dzerzhinsky. What kind of defence when the government has already issued an order for the arrest of the Revolutionary Military Committee! (To Sverdlov.) Why are you silent?

Trotsky. If the government takes it into its head to arrest us, we will mount machine guns on the roof of the Smolny. I will issue the instructions now. But I don't expect such vigorous action from the government. It is paralyzed, it is only waiting for the broom of history to sweep it from power.

Dzerzhinsky. We need Lenin, we must seek his advice. Let's send a trustworthy escort for him.... He ought to have been here long ago.

Stalin. It's premature. We cannot risk his life.

Trotsky. We'll take power, and then Vladimir Ilyich will go to the Smolny with a guard of honour (smiles) and on a white horse.... And so we will not allow ourselves to be provoked into taking action, we will not allow ourselves to be involved, we will only answer and....

Stalin. We will wait for the congress. (Leaving.) I will return in a minute.

Trotsky. Yes, without question - we will wait for the congress.

Dzerzhinsky (sitting down near Sverdlov). Why are you silent?

Continued from our previous issue.

Sverdlov. I can't get the cry in his last letter out of my head: "To be on the defensive is the death of armed revolt."

Fofanova's apartment. 8:25 a.m.

Fofanova with Lenin who is surrounded by newspapers. They are breakfasting.

Fofanova. Rabochi Put was not on sale at a single newsstand. I even went to the Finland railway station - it wasn't there either, and no one knows anything.

Lenin. Strange. What's happening outside?

Fofanova. As usual... everyone is hurrying to work....

Lenin. You didn't see any troops?

Fofanova. No, I didn't notice any... Don't worry, Vladimir Ilyich, everything will be all right.

Lenin. There might not be such a favourable situation as today for a hundred years.... We agreed to start today.... But if the desire to wait for the congress has again prevailed, it is complete idiocy or complete betrayal.

Fofanova. Go on, what kind of betrayal..., how can you say such a thing!

Lenin. I am just nervous. Do you think it is easy for me to be in such isolation when everything is at stake? Why don't they want me to be at the Smolny?

Fofanova. You'll be caught if you go out.

Lenin. They wouldn't catch me if I were at the Smolny... The whole point is that revolutions won't tolerate any stopping. One

must always go further, deeper... onward all the time... not running ahead, but not trailing behind.... But no stopping... onward... onward... as Goethe said, "Weiter, Weiter." When will you be back?

Fofanova. By eight.

Lenin. Give this message to my wife on the way.

Fofanova. Vladimir Ilyich, I know that when you worry, you start pacing around the apartment... your steps are heavy, a man's steps, and the neighbours below know that I live here alone....

Lenin. All right, I shall try to be careful. I'll walk on tiptoe....

Fofanova. When I return, I will ring three times as usual.

The Smolny, 11:30 a.m.

Stalin downstage

Stalin. The comrades have asked me to put you in the picture as to the situation in the city at this present moment. There are two tendencies within the Revolutionary Military Committee, one for staging an immediate uprising, the other for first mobilizing forces. I feel impelled to tell you that the Central Committee of our Party inclines towards the second view, that is, to continue mustering our forces. We stake on popular pressure on the Congress of Soviets. The old government will yield to the new one all the more peacefully the more forceful, powerful and better organized mass action is. (Stepping aside.) For now I wish to vehemently protest against this hostile anti-Party sally from the theatre. Never at any time could I have had a common platform with Trotsky. It's sheer coercion, we have no freedom of action, are forced to say heavens know what to please doubtful views, and are compelled to obey! I protest!

Dzerzhinsky. Stalin, leave the theatre alone. These are your words, your stand; it was all set out in 1922 in the Proletarskaya Revolutsiya magazine. Then you didn't protest. Why so? Was it because we were all still alive at the time?

Stalin. Generally I dislike the idea of your muckraking here, of your nit-picking as to our opinions and relationships. The people are history's motive force. Why don't we see our heroic people here? Why aren't we shown the masses? Why don't we have brought out onto the stage those who effected their epoch-making exploit in October 1917? What, a play about the Revolution but without the people in it? As I see it, that is by no means accidental.

Sverdlov. Mooted is another point, as to how much in life and especially in revolution, depends on the men on the ship's bridge. This is an issue of concern to all.

Bukharin. Except for the men on the bridge.

Fofanova's apartment, 12:20 p.m.

Lenin, clearly disturbed, briskly paces up and down. Plekhanov and Martov rise from their seats.

The light changes

Plekhanov. I'd like to talk to you by virtue of my having taught the first lessons in Russian social-democracy.

Martov. While I'd like to do that by virtue of me being an old... well, former friend.

Lenin(abruptly). I've no time for empty talk. Our stands are delineated, the barricades are up, we know each other's arguments by heart, so what's the point of engaging in still more talk?

Martov. In that now we have before us all of your experience and can calmly analyze it and draw the conclusions that those seeking to follow your path will need.

Lenin. But why at this very moment, when my nerves are stretched to breaking point, should I listen to you?

Plekhanov. For the simple reason, dammit, that we, young man, are Socialists! Though we couldn't see eye to eye on the ways and means of realizing an idea, but it is our common idea! Hence, any of your tragedies is our tragedy, and vice versa! Anyone who will not accept another's plight as his own is no Socialist!

Martov. The Bolsheviks have always been my comrades and so they remain, despite their terrible blunder.

Lenin. The hate you feel towards us, hate that is indecent, has made of you today the rallying centre for anti-Bolshevism.

Plekhanov. I won't deny that.

Lenin. While tomorrow...

Plekhanov. You very well know what's going to happen tomorrow! Tomorrow Savinkov will approach me and suggest that I as the most prestigious Socialist head the new government that will put the power of the Council of People's Commissars to fire and sword. You also know what I told him! "I have dedicated forty years of my life to the working class not to gun it down the moment it errs!"

Lenin. Yes, I know that.

Plekhanov. Whereas I know what will overtake you in five years' time, how your comrade who's turned into your overseer will be helping you in your fight against the accursed sickness. That tragedy which befell you at the close of life warrants the hope that you'll lend an ear to what I have to say.

Lenin. Overseer, indeed! It's all far more complex than that.

Martov. After the diaries and notes in which your secretaries jotted down all their conversations with you were made public, the whole world is aware of the kind of struggle you waged in the winter of 1923 for the right to give the Party your final injunctions. How you nicked those moments for dictation, how much you suffered for lack of newspapers and information. No overseer?! He definitely knew that you took his patronage as personal lack of liberty. With Fotieva putting him fully in the picture, he definitely knew that the medical prescription of complete isolation from outside life with which he'd cushioned you was something you regarded as resulting from what he'd told the doctors to do and not vice versa. If he saw that, if he knew that that gave so much anguish and torment, why didn't he abandon it, why didn't he step aside?

Stalin. I tried, but my request was turned down.

Martov. A silent, sick Lenin suited your books, a dictating Lenin, never. Yesterday he demanded the General Secretary's replacement, so what would he ask tomorrow? Hence a still stricter regime of treatment and isolation and still harsher penalties for all who dared to disrupt it.

The light changes

Stalin. Look here, Krupskaya, I want to talk to you. How's Vladimir Ilyich doing? Anything new there?

Krupskaya. Fair to middling, but no more.

Stalin. I sent him some grapes and pears that comrades had brought me from Tiflis. They're very good grapes, of the autumn crop.

Krupskaya. Thank you.

Stalin. Tell me, Krupskaya, are you aware of the Politburo's decision as to Ilyich's medical treatment? Have you been informed of it?

Krupskaya. Yes, so what?

Stalin. At its latest plenary meeting the Central Committee discussed foreign trade, an issue that is of great concern to our patient.

Krupskaya. He's worried that you, Bukharin and other Central Committee members could make such a mistake.

Stalin. He sent Trotsky a letter, which makes it clear even to a child that he's fully in the picture.

Krupskaya. So what?

Stalin. How dare you violate the Politburo ruling?

Krupskaya. Are you really serious?

Stalin. How dare you tell Lenin of political events? Don't you really understand how sick Ilyich is? The slightest excitement may be fatal. One can't fiddle with the Party's lot.

Krupskaya. But I don't understand.

Stalin. You don't, do you? Do you think the Party has two sets of rules, one for everyone, the other for Lenin's wife? What will the Party come to, if you have two sets of rules, one for the ordinary folk, the other for the elect? I'm telling you straight out that we won't stand for that! As General Secretary I forbid you to talk of political subjects with Lenin!

Krupskaya. But I'm better than any doctor...

Stalin. That's not so. Nobody has or will monopolize Lenin, neither wives nor sisters. Only when he gets better and is back on his feet once again.

Krupskaya. What are you saying?

Stalin. Otherwise, despite all my respect for you I'll be compelled to have you on the carpet before the Control Commission. And may you have no illusions as to what the Control Commission'll say! Lenin's health is not your family asset, it's the asset of the entire Party.

Krupskaya. The wife knows better...

Stalin. Sleeping with the leader doesn't mean knowing the leader!

Krupskaya. How dare you!

Lenin. What's the matter, Nadya? What's upset you?

The light changes

Krupskaya. Nothing really, I'm simply tired after walking a bit too fast. I'll lie down for a little while. (Aside, to Kamenev.) Lev Borisovich!

Kamenev. Yes, what is it, Nadezhda Konstantinovna?

Krupskaya. It's about that brief letter I wrote to Vladimir Ilyich's dictation with the doctors' permission. Stalin took the liberty of being extremely offensive towards me.

Kamenev. Please don't take it so much to heart.

Krupskaya. It's not my first day in the Party. In all thirty years I've never heard a single rude word from a Party comrade.

Kamenev. Please, Nadezhda Konstantinovna...

Krupskaya. I cherish the interests of the Party and of Ilyich as much as Stalin does.

Kamenev. For sure!

Krupskaya. And I know better than any doctor does what I can say to Ilyich and what I can't. I know what worries him and what doesn't, better, at any rate, than Stalin does!

Kamenev. Please, Nadezhda Konstantinovna, don't take on so!

Krupskaya. Please protect me from such rude poking into private life, from such unseemly vilification and threats. Though I don't doubt the Control Commission will unanimously pass the decision that Stalin takes the liberty of holding over my head, I have neither the energy nor the time to spare for that stupid altercation. I, too, am a living creature and my nerves are strained to the limit!

Kamenev. Only please don't tell Ilyich anything about it. I'll settle the entire matter!

The light changes

Lenin. By now three months have gone by. Has he settled the matter?

Krupskaya. How did you get wind of it?

Lenin. What did Stalin say to you?

Krupskaya. How did you find out?

Lenin. That's of no matter. So what did he say to you?

Krupskaya. Nothing really. You're mistaken, you've misunderstood it all.

Lenin. Very well. I involuntarily overheard what you were talking about with Manyasha.

Krupskaya. This morning?

Lenin. Yes.

Krupskaya. And you were waiting for Manyasha to go?

Lenin. So what did he say to you?

Krupskaya. Get back to bed at once. Look at yourself...

Lenin. I couldn't care less!

Krupskaya. Take your medicine.

Lenin. A fig for your medicine! What did he say to you?

Krupskaya. You mustn't upset yourself so.

Lenin. Tell me at once what he said. Not for a moment will I put up with an insult to my wife. Why, we were warned already 40 years ago that the Russian Revolution would grant the one and only right to dishonour. So do we agree? Do we wash our hands? A Bolshevik without honour...

Krupskaya. Do you want to risk your life? The price'd be too much to pay!

Lenin. Honour is above price! So what did he say to you?

Krupskaya (aware that there is no alternative, that each fresh attempt to evade the issue will only aggravate matters). In connection with the letter to Trotsky that you dictated to me.

Lenin. What did he say?

Krupskaya. He swore at me. But I told him I'd forgotten it.

Lenin. What did he actually say?

Krupskaya (after a pause). Something nasty, vile.

Lenin. What, exactly?

Krupskaya. Isn't that enough for you?

Lenin. Help me to sit down. Lend me your arm...

Krupskaya. Volodya... my dear Volodya, it's all rubbish, nonsense. I've forgotten it.

Lenin. Give me your hand.

Krupskaya. Volodya, please don't close your eyes!

Lenin. A moment, I'll - I'll cope.

Krupskaya. Let me call the doctor!

Lenin. Don't! It's our own affair! He'll be told at once. One moment. I'll - I'll just take a little rest, I'll close my eyes, I feel dizzy, see spots before the eyes - I'll feel better in a moment. I must pull myself together, to dictate one more letter. Take my hand and sit by my side. If I relapse, it'll be just for a moment - so don't feel frightened. I'll pull myself together... and dictate everything that needs be said in such a case. (He falls silent.)

The light changes

Martov. Vladimir Ilyich, put him out of your mind!

Plekhanov. As we're having a serious talk, we need you to be in a tip-top form.

Lenin. I'm all ears, I swear I won't interrupt.

Plekhanov. Vladimir Ilyich, the flour with which to bake the Russian socialist pie still isn't available. Our mujik still isn't ready for socialism. Do you realize how many pots and pans will be broken before your celebrated kitchen cook learns to govern? You just can't dive into the water without first learning to swim, otherwise we'll simply drown the whole socialist idea.

Lenin (with deliberate calmness). But, Georgi Valentinovich, I ask you, who's going to enlighten the people? Who's going to teach them democracy? Those who realize the political enlightenment of the masses spells the end of their own power? But supposing the people themselves take power into their own hands and proceeding therefrom themselves engage in culture and enlightenment? You say you can't dive into the water without first learning to swim? That's very true, Georgi Valentinovich, but, on the other hand, you won't learn to swim unless you first dive into the water.

Martov. What worries me is something else, that only the stick will get the unenlightened, drunken people to toe the line. I even find myself asking whether you, who never sought personal power, who invariably declined to have yourself enveloped in an egocentric halo, whether you would not come to lead the terrorist abolition of the revolutionary chapter, or, on the contrary, fall victim to it? All right, all right, I can feel almost physically the impact of your killing sarcasm. Yet heed not so much me as your like-minded friend, whom you adore...

Lenin (guessing right). Rosa? You mean Rosa Luxemburg? Her "Letters from Prison"? I'd be only too pleased to do so! Even though, after her release, she rethought some things, even so that does not alter anything, as Rosa always issued profound and serious warnings! Realize, though, that she is a person of staunch convictions. Aren't you afraid she'll hit back? Rosa, let's hear what you have to say!

Rosa Luxemburg. First, I must say I'm delighted to be entering the Russian scene for the first time, as before I seem to have been ill-suited. Second, let me tell you here that at no time did I ever need to reexamine what accompanied me when I was born as a Socialist and what will attend me when I die.

Martov. A little lower down, Rosa, where you speak about the clique.

Rosa. Allow me, Yuli Osipovich, to decide for myself what to say and when. (Lenin chuckles.) The Bolsheviks, having effected their Revolution, were first among us to become men of action and thus redeem the honour of international socialism. Thank god they had the courage to jettison the dogmas of their

Mensheviks and of our dimwitted disciples of Marx, those who, considering Russia's backwardness, denied her the right to a proletarian revolution. Thank god, there eventually came to the fore among us men who showed the entire world that they preferred not congresses, and conventions or speeches and reports about revolution, but the very revolution itself!

Lenin. Bravo, Rosa!

Rosa. To me, a fanatical democrat, they seemed shocking, but I've always been looking for attenuating circumstances and found them. They were more than right to have used the iron fist to stifle any resistance, but such practices should not be the general rule for a lengthy period of time.

Lenin. Bravo, Rosa!

Rosa. But, if political activity in the country is stifled...

Martov. That's what I wanted to hear!

Rosa (continuing unmindful of Martov)... the Soviets would not avoid an ongoing paralysis. With no general election, no freedom of the press and assembly, no free conflict of views in every social institution, public activity will be extinguished to become mere pretence. The bureaucracy will be the sole active element. Social public activity will gradually slide into lethargy, and but a few dozen highly energetic leading Party functionaries will govern, motivated by unlimited idealism. Real leadership will be in the hands of this dozen, while the working-class elite will be convened from time to time merely to applaud what the leaders say and vote unanimously for a resolution drafted in advance: hence, in effect, this will be the power of a clique, and it stands to reason that theirs will not be the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the dictatorship of a handful of politicoes. As I see it the dictatorship of the proletariat is the most boundless broadest democracy of all. Socialism, stripped of political liberty, is not socialism. Without freedom you have no political education of the masses, no full involvement of the masses in political activity. Freedom solely for the government's active supporters, solely for Party members, however numerous, is no freedom. Freedom, always and exclusively, is for those who think differently. For the Bolsheviks danger emerges whenever the temporary, revolting need is made a permanent virtue.

Lenin. Bravo, Rosa! (Then, calmly, even amicably, to Martov.) You once wrote about a five-year reign of terror that lies in store for us. But let me tell you that if we don't get going the right and proper relationships between worker and peasant, we'll have not five years but twenty to forty years for sure of counterrevolution and terror! Unless we involve the people in government, we'll be merely government for the people, not of the people, place the country at the mercy of the bureaucrats and substitute politicking for politics. If we come to fear democracy as much as the devil the cross, if the class is replaced by the Party and the Party in turn by an apparatus hanging on everything the leader says, while all original opinion differing from the leader's is proscribed as treason, if the turbulence of life is squashed by fear and replaced by barrack drill, we will find ourselves squarely faced with that most horrible of questions which is: "What for?" That is a realistic, formidable danger, and Rosa is right when she says that that possibility exists; however, that outcome is by no means bound to ensue, it's not programmed to occur! I'm quite convinced of that! Everybody who can read and think will, I trust, realize where we have the programme of the October Revolution and where we have its distorted discredited image. I fully agree with Rosa that the danger lies in making a virtue out of necessity. (Martov and Plekhanov are silent.) Very well, let's revert to the 24th of October. Yes, everything's in turmoil, and our role, I assure you, is secondary, with the trend of events carrying the Party along with it, not the other way round. The people will act, come what may, and if they do so without us, anarchy and chaos will be rife for certain- unless we captain the movement, elevate it, introduce an awareness. Either Kornilov's murderous dictatorship or the proletarian revolution, socialist democracy. So what are we to do?

Plekhanov. At this present moment we must, of course, prevent spontaneous action. By every means available. God forbid your provoking a new Kornilov! Rather let the bourgeois revolution settle in, as eventually its democratic evolution will place a socialist revolution on the order of the day. However, in the meantime...

Lenin. That's just it - what shall we be having in the meantime?

Plekhanov. Slowly and gradually, step after step...

Lenin (gaily). With slow motion, halfhearted veering, is that it? Long ago, when I was in internal exile, we had our own poet. My closest friend... a fine revolutionary in his salad years. What an amazing comrade... what a pure soul... what a wise and clever person... How deeply we felt his absence later on... And his sense of humour! All that talk about going slowly and gradually, step after step induced him to compose a brilliant parody. (Sings.)

Storm clouds hand over us,
Dark forces strike at our necks...
(To Martov.) Come on, join in!

Martov (laughing, to Plekhanov.) It's mine. (Joins in.)

The backs of the slaves are covered with weals
The savage whip lashes out furiously...

The Bolsheviks - Sverdlov, Bukharin, Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Trotsky, Zinovyev,Dzerzhinsky, Kamenev, Krupskaya gaily join in, and there rings out a song that reminds them of their younger days when they were all together.

But rubbing the sinful body,
Thinking concretely, let's look at the facts.
"The whip'll wear out," let's tell the people,
"And you'll be free in a hundred years from now."
With slow motion, halfhearted veering
Quetly go forwards, working folk!
In our struggle the autocrat's crown
Will not be touched with rebellious hand.
Drenched in the blood of the people, the thrones
Will sometime collapse of their own accord!

Do not tempt us with politics grand,
You demagogues of the working masses;
Don't din our ears with your communisms,
For we believe in the might of supplementary benefit!
So if you can, do, with due caution,
Proceed forwards, working folk!

Bukharin. Three cheers for the author!

General jolification

Lenin (to Martov). Such is the irony that history affords. Who ever thought you'd parody yourself... (Sits down next to Martov.) We both died about the same time. Indeed, when I chanced to read that you were sick, I assure you, we missed you deeply. Very well, let's put that aside... (Rising, to Plekhanov and Martov.) So what are we to do, gentlemen who style themselves comrades? What are we to do on the 24th of October? This is a crisis, a blind alley, one that is unprecedented. From bad to worse with every new day. So for a people driven to such desperate straits, in so hopeless a situation... hasn't it the right to rush headlong into the struggle and force its way to freedom, even though it has only a hundred-to-one chance? Even if it upsets the commonly accepted tenor of things? Tell me, Mr Plekhanov!

Plekhanov. Why do you, Lenin, dislike me so much?

Lenin (after a pause). There was nobody in life whom I adored so much, whom I admired so deeply as you... Blinded by this infatuation, I behaved like a slave, though it's unseemly to be a slave. For long I told myself to ignore the rudeness... the craving for limitless rule... the insincerity - the chess-board moves - what was there left of my adoration? Yet we accomplished what you taught us to do.

The light changes

(To be continued)

Concerning the Nobel Prize for Boris Pasternak

Now that Boris Pasternak's novel "Doctor Zhivago" will become available to the Soviet reader, I have decided to write this letter.

I read "Doctor Zhivago" before it had caused any scandal. Pasternak gave me one of the earliest copies of the manuscript, unfortunately for a very short period of time - a single night. I read the novel in a hurry, flipping through many of the pages. At first reading I didn't like it very much. At that time, writers of my generation were keen on Hemingway and Remarque. They read and imitated their terse phrases and unsentimental, "manly" style of dialogue. Quite undiscriminatingly I had also taken an interest then in modern painting and enjoyed literally everything that did not square with conventional realistic style.

The novel by Pasternak, who was a versatile master at experimentation in poetry, disappointed me in its traditional, classical quality, it lacked formal innovation. It was written in a nineteen-century style, slow-moving, meditational. Returning the manuscript early in the morning, I tried to evade expressing my direct opinion to the author, but Pasternak gave me no chance. Looking me straight in the eye he asked: "Did you like it?" Looking aside, I mumbled something to the effect: "I like your poems better." Pasternak became upset and made me promise that some day I would read the novel without rushing through it.

I kept my word and reread the novel in 1966 when I was sailing on the catamaran Mikeshkin along the Lena River in Siberia. I read the novel when I was off duty, lying on a narrow bunk, and whenever I took my eyes off its pages and looked at the severe beauty of the Siberian landscape moving by the window, it seemed that there was no boundary between the novel and the surrounding nature. I was deeply moved by the novel when I read it unhurriedly, attentively. The only thing I didn't like and still don't is the epilogue, but it is only a detail. However, when I read the novel for the first and second time, it had never occurred to me that the book was, among other things, "hostile." Pasternak, undoubtedly, deserved the Nobel Prize as a poet, long before he wrote the novel. The fact that he was awarded the prize after the scandal caused by the novel had assumed a political flavour. But Pasternak personally was not to blame for this - he stood above any political or literary intrigues.

The tragedy of the situation lay in the fact that the pure name of the person who wrote with hope: "You're nigh, the distance of socialism. You will say - nearby?.." set off speculation, on the one hand, by the enemies of socialism in the West and, on the other, by the opponents of socialist openness and democracy internally.

It was also horrible that the so-called "representatives of the people" began to humiliate Pasternak. They castigated the poet according to the principle: "I have not read the novel, but I am angry to the bottom of my heart..." The behaviour of some writers also left much to be desired, those who yielded to the deplorable campaign to exclude Pasternak and force him to emigrate. At the time I was the secretary of the YCL organization at the Writers' Union and was under immense pressure to speak on behalf of the young people and condemn Pasternak. But I flatly refused. One of my senior poet--friends unexpectedly, spoke at the notorious meeting where Pasternak was excluded from the Writers' Union. I stopped speaking to him for 5 years afterwards.

How did Pasternak himself react to the award? He was utterly surprised, happy and he expressed these feelings in the telegram he sent to the Swedish Academy. At the time he did not have an inkling of how things would develop. He did not associate the prize only with the novel, and the Swedish Academy, in presenting the award, wrote in black and white that the prize was "for outstanding achievements in modern lyric poetry and in the field of great Russian prose." Not for the novel. However, it was in here that the reactionary press in the West and the initiators of the anti-Pasternak campaign in our country placed the emphasis.

Ilya Ehrenburg once told me the following. After the death of Pasternak, Khrushchev confessed to Ehrenburg that he had never read the novel "Doctor Zhivago," but had only laid eyes on quotations selected by the aides. As a guest of Marshal Tito on the island of Brioni, Khrushchev first saw the novel published in Russian. In reading it, he became convinced that the novel contained nothing "counterrevolutionary." "I have been deceived..." said Khrushchev to Ehrenburg. Ehrenburg asked him hopefully: "Why don't we publish this novel?" Khrushchev thought it over and then said: "We shall publish it. But let us allow at least a little time to pass, Ilya Grigoryevich, we have just recently set the propaganda machine in motion against the novel..." Khrushchev did not have time to honour his promise. Now we are atoning for our guilt before Pasternak, and it must not be partial atonement, but full atonement. We are guilty because Pasternak has refused the prize.

Pasternak had to refuse the Nobel Prize because he was, in fact, given a choice - either the Nobel Prize or the Motherland. It was at this time that the Komsomol leader Vladimir Semichastny and a group of Literary Institute students shamefully signed the petition that brazenly called for a forced expulsion of Pasternak from the country. Pasternak made the only decision worthy of an outstanding poet - he chose the Motherland.

He never lived to receive the prize which he so imminently deserved as a celebrated Russian poet. His refusal was not the refusal of Sartre who had personal motives. Pasternak's refusal was not, in fact, the refusal to accept the prize. But, for all intents and purposes, the refusal to leave the homeland. Is it fair, now that we are approaching the centennial of the birth of the great humanitarian poet, that "refused" is still marked against his name in the list of Nobel Prize winners?

We in the U.S.S.R. have cleared Pasternak's name of slander and reversed the decision to exclude him from the Writers' Union. Publication of his works runs into many thousands of copies. The commission on the Pasternak heritage has decided to create a museum in Peredelkino. And there must be no ambiguity about Pasternak's Nobel Prize. His life and work are proof that he has deserved it.

EVGENY EVTUSHENKO



In search of kindness

In these pictures wisdom and naiveté, purity and kindness, eternal and fickle love merge into a whole. One picture shows a man in hat and boots, with a fiddle in his hands, contemplating something he has created. What is it?

Georgi Krutinsky, a member of the U.S.S.R. Artists' Union, has designed more than 70 theatrical productions in Moscow and other cities. The artist says his cooperation with stage director Roman Viktyuk has been particularly satisfying. The two men's joint efforts include the productions of plays such as "The Petty Demon" by Fyodor Sologub (staged in Tallinn), "Music Lessons" and "Cinzano" by Lyudmila Petrushevskaya, and "Duck Hunting" by Alexander Vampilov (all staged in Moscow). In addition, the artist has created dozens of posters for Lenin, Tolstoi and Chekhov anniversary celebrations.

The artist's house is a small log cabin in Moscow's Zamoskvorechye district—a living monument of Russian architecture—that he has restored at his own expense. His studio takes up almost the whole of the house. It is crowded with easels, canvases, paint racks, glass vessels of every conceivable shape, and numerous grandfather clocks. The walls are hung with the artist's own paintings and drawings created over the past few years. He uses a now rare monotype technique and the graceful lines and lacy quality of the pictures are difficult to render. A single wavering stroke will spoil everything.

Krutinsky works for book publishers and takes part in numerous international exhibitions. More than 30 of his paintings are on display in our state museums. Many of his paintings and black-and-white graphic works have been acquired by private collectors in France, Britain, Japan, the U.S.A., and the F.R.G. The artist is well known for his enormous energy, amazing vitality, extraordinary organizing ability, inexhaustible optimism and, last but not least, infinite industry. His themes and images, embodied now in exquisite lines, now in harmonious colour schemes, take the onlooker into a world of eternal problems and timeless passions.

Krutinsky, with many plans and just bursting with new ideas, is now in his prime. He has his own vision of the world and his manner is distinctive.

All his works—be it a still life, a portrait, or a stage design—bear the unmistakable imprint of his personality. His pictures are filled with children, pensive and slightly sad; old people with a lifetime behind them, who know something far beyond our reach and are all the wiser and kinder for it; and women who epitomize eternity...

Let us now enter into this amazing world created by Georgi Krutinsky, and try to understand it.

The artist Georgi Krutinsky

"An artist's studio"

"Zoya"

"A little fiddler"

Photos by Evgeny Gabrielev







A winter scene.

At daybreak.

Janis Klavins
(U.S.S.R.)

INTERNATIONAL CONTEST

THE EARTH— OUR COMMON HOME

ИНДЕКС 70622 НА АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ